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The United States Supreme Court has decided more cases
involving the interrogation of juveniles than any other aspect of
juvenile justice administration.1 Although it has cautioned trial
judges to be especially sensitive to the effects of youthfulness
and immaturity on a defendant's ability to waive or to invoke
her Miranda rights and to make voluntary statements, the
Court has not mandated any special procedural protections for
immature suspects. Instead, it endorsed the adult waiver stan-
dard-"knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the "totality
of the circumstances"-to gauge the validity of a juvenile's
waiver of Miranda rights. 2
At the same time, developmental psychologists have exam-
ined adolescents' adjudicative competence and their capacity to
exercise or waive Miranda rights. These psychological studies
strongly question whether juveniles possess the cognitive abil-
1. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661-65, 666-68 (2004)
(defining "custody" and discussing the impact of youthfulness on whether a
"reasonable person" would feel free to leave); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
727-28 (1979) (endorsing an adult standard of knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary under the totality of the circumstances to gauge the validity of a juve-
nile's waiver of Miranda rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (recognizing
juveniles' Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52-55 (1962) (assessing the voluntariness of a juvenile's
confession); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598-601 (1948) (same).
2. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-27.
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ity, maturity, and judgment necessary to exercise legal rights.
The psychological research convincingly indicates that younger
and mid-adolescent youths are not equal to adults in the inter-
rogation room and that they require procedural protections be-
yond Miranda to protect them and to enable them to exercise
their rights. However, the developmental psychological re-
search also suggests that youths sixteen and seventeen years of
age appear to function on par with adults. 3
Police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges who
deal regularly with the products of interrogation--confessions,
admissions, denials, and leads to other evidence-do not have
the luxury to analyze the interrogation process systematically.
By contrast, the appellate court judges who frame the rules of
interrogation and the law professors and criminologists who
write about the practice lack ready access to the interrogation
rooms where police routinely interview criminal suspects. As a
result, most of what appellate judges, criminologists, legal
scholars, policy makers, and the public think we know about in-
terrogation derives from anecdotal cases involving egregious
abuses or false-confessions and from popular television drama
programs-NYPD Blues and Law & Order-and "reality"
shows-Cops-that depict police questioning suspects.
Although four decades have passed since the Supreme Court
decided Miranda v. Arizona,4 remarkably little more observa-
tional empirical research exists now than did then about what
actually occurs inside an interrogation room. Additionally, we
have no naturalistic observational research about the ways
that police routinely question juveniles or how these juveniles
respond.
This Article begins to fill that empirical void by analyzing
quantitative and qualitative data-interrogation tapes and
transcripts, police reports, juvenile court filings, and probation
and sentencing reports-of the routine police interrogations of
sixty-six juveniles sixteen years of age or older whom prosecu-
tors charged with a felony offense. Part I analyzes "the law" of
juvenile interrogation and how courts and legislatures have re-
sponded to youthfulness and immaturity during interrogation.
Part II examines developmental and social psychological re-
search on adolescents' competence to exercise legal rights and
their vulnerabilities in the interrogation room. Part III reviews
3. See infra Part I.
4. See 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the Supreme Court's perception of police interrogation at the
time of Miranda, how interrogation manuals and techniques
have evolved in response to Miranda, and the limited empirical
research on contemporary interrogation practices. Part IV de-
scribes the data and methodology used in this study. Part V
analyzes quantitative and qualitative data about the routine
police interrogation of sixty-six juveniles sixteen years of age or
older whom prosecutors charged with felony-level offenses. 5
This Article provides the first empirical test of adolescents' ca-
pacity to understand and to waive or invoke their Miranda
rights. The Article concludes with a discussion of findings, pol-
icy implications, and a call for further research.
I. INTERROGATING JUVENILES:
THE LAW "ON THE BOOKS"
After the Supreme Court in In re Gault applied the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to delinquency proceedings, 6 the
right to a warning prior to interrogation previously developed
in Miranda v. Arizona applied to juveniles. 7 Under current law,
when gauging the validity of a juvenile's waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights, courts must decide whether she made a
"knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver under the "totality
5. See also Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2007) (examining the responses of the fifty-three juveniles who waived their
rights).
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-57. See generally Barry C. Feld, Criminal-
izing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 141, 152-57 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice]
(analyzing the Supreme Court's rationale for incorporating the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination in state delinquency proceedings); Barry
C. Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the
Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 111-20 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights] (analyzing the in-
adequacy of the Miranda framework to safeguard juveniles' ability to exercise
the privilege against self-incrimination).
7. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that Miranda
applies to juvenile proceedings, the Court, in Fare v. Michael C., "assume[d]
without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the pre-
sent [juvenile] proceedings." 442 U.S. at 717 n.4; see Larry E. Holtz, Miranda
in a Juvenile Setting: A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 534, 534-35 (1987) (discussing whether a police officer must modify
Miranda warnings when they are administered to juveniles).
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of the circumstances," and whether she made any ensuing
statements voluntarily.8
Long before Miranda, the Supreme Court cautioned trial
judges to closely scrutinize the impact of youthfulness and in-
experience on the voluntariness of juveniles' confessions in Ha-
ley v. Ohio9 and in Gallegos v. Colorado.10 In Gault, it reiterated
8. Fare, 442 U.S. at 724-27; Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra
note 6, at 169-90.
9. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). In Haley, police interrogated a fifteen-year-old
"lad" in relays beginning shortly after midnight, denied him access to counsel,
and confronted him with confessions by co-defendants until he finally con-
fessed at five o'clock a.m. Id. at 600. The Court reversed his conviction and
ruled that a confession obtained under these circumstances was involuntary:
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of
his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him,
the callous attitude of the police toward his rights combine to con-
vince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means
which the law should not sanction.
Id. at 600-01. In so doing, the Court emphasized Haley's youth and inexperi-
ence as factors that increased his vulnerability to coercive interrogation tech-
niques:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature
man was involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim
of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must
be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy .... He cannot
be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which
would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm
a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which
the crisis of adolescence produces. . . [W]e cannot believe that a lad
of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs
counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then
of panic.
Id. at 599-600.
10. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos, the Court identified the factors that
rendered a fourteen-year-old juvenile's confession involuntary:
The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for
his parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of
the Juvenile Court, the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a
lawyer or a friend-all these combine to make us conclude that the
formal confession on which this conviction may have rested was ob-
tained in violation of due process.
Id. at 55 (citation omitted). Again, the Court emphasized the vulnerability of
youth and reiterated that the age of the accused constituted a special circum-
stance that affects the voluntariness of confessions:
[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, ... is not equal to
the police in knowledge and understanding ... and . . . is unable to
know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights .... A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could
have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity
could not .... Without some adult protection against this inequality, a
14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such con-
stitutional rights as he had.
[91:26
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its concerns about the effects of youthfulness on the voluntari-
ness of statements.11 Thus, the Court had long recognized that
children are not the equals of adults in the interrogation room
and that they require greater procedural safeguards, such as
the presence of a parent or an attorney, to compensate for their
vulnerability and susceptibility to coercive influences.
However, in Fare v. Michael C., a more conservative Court
considered the validity of a Miranda waiver given by a 16 -
year-old who had several prior arrests, considerable experience
with the police, and had "served time" in a youth camp and re-
pudiated its earlier concern that youthfulness increased juve-
niles' vulnerability to coercion. 12 In Fare, the juvenile repeat-
edly requested access to his probation officer prior to
interrogation. 13 However, the Court ruled that requesting to
speak with a probation officer did not invoke the Miranda
privilege against self-incrimination or constitute the functional
equivalent of a request to consult with counsel, either of which
would have required police to cease questioning. 14 Fare held
that the "totality of the circumstances" test used to evaluate
the validity of adult waivers governed the validity of juveniles'
waivers as well as the admissibility of their confessions.' 5 Fare
refused to provide children with greater procedural protections
than those afforded adults. 16 The Court rejected the view that
Id. at 54.
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 45 (repeating that "admissions and confes-
sions of juveniles require special caution").
12. 442 U.S. 707, 726-27.
13. Id. at 710.
14. Id. at 722-24; cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (hold-
ing that police may not interrogate an accused after the person has requested
an opportunity to consult with counsel). Earlier, the California Supreme Court
had held in People v. Burton that when a child who is in custody and who is
interrogated without the presence of counsel requests to see one of his or her
parents, further questioning must cease. 491 P.2d 793, 798 (Cal. 1971). In In
re Michael C., the California Supreme Court extended Burton's "parental re-
quest" rule to a youth's request to consult with his probation officer. 579 P.2d
7, 11 (1978), rev'd sub nor. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). The Su-
preme Court in Fare rejected this position and distinguished the role of coun-
sel from that of probation officers in the Miranda process. Fare, 442 U.S. at
722-24.
15. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
16. Id.; see Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 6, at 171;
Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An His-
torical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 461 (1981); Irene
Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with
Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656,
686-91 (1980).
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developmental or psychological differences between juveniles
and adults required different rules or special procedural protec-
tions during interrogation. 17 Instead, the Court required chil-
dren to assert their legal rights clearly and unambiguously,
just like adults, and rebuffed the argument that trial courts
cannot adequately measure young peoples' exercise or waiver of
Miranda rights against the adult standard.18
17. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
18. Id. at 725-26. Most states adhere to Fare, allow juveniles to waive
their Miranda rights under the "totality of the circumstances," and do not re-
quire parental or legal assistance. See Kimberly Larson, Improving the "Kan-
garoo Courts" A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles' Waiver of
Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 645-46 (2003) (summarizing the majority of
states' use of the "totality of circumstances" test and the factors they consider);
see, e.g., Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 720 (Alaska 1979) (concluding that ju-
veniles may waive Miranda rights without consulting a parent or other adult);
Carter v. State, 697 So. 2d 529, 533-34 (Fla. 1997) (affirming the "totality" ap-
proach and upholding the trial court's exclusion of the "Grisso Test," which is
used to measure a juvenile's ability to comprehend Miranda warnings); Dutil
v. State, 606 P.2d 269 (Wash. 1980) (declining to adopt a per se rule requiring
presence of a parent, guardian, or counsel). The California Supreme Court
held that
a minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of capi-
tal offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other re-
sponsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends
not on his age alone but on a combination of that factor with such
other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and
ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement.
People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967).
Appellate courts identify a multitude of factors that bear on the validity of
a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights. However, they do not assign controlling
weight to any particular factor and instead rely on the discretion of trial courts
to weigh the various combinations of factors. In practice, trial judges only ex-
clude confessions obtained under the most egregious circumstances. See Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 6, at 176; see, e.g., In re W.C., 657
N.E.2d 908, 913, 922-23 (Ill. 1995) (upholding the validity of a waiver by a
thirteen-year old who was "illiterate and moderately mentally retarded with
an IQ of 48, ... the equivalent developmentally of a six- to eight-year old. ...
[and] possessing the emotional maturity of a six- to seven-year old"); Wallace
J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873, 1902 (1996) (explaining that at a hearing
to determine the admissibility of statements, "police officers frequently relate
that they read the Miranda warnings and that the child agreed to talk").
Overtly coercive police interrogation techniques, very young age, and signifi-
cant mental deficiencies do not prevent trial judges from finding "voluntary"
waivers. See, e.g., W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979, 980, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (affirming the trial judge's admission of the confession of a ten-year old
boy with an IQ of seventy, who had been placed in a learning disability pro-
gram, and whom police had questioned for six hours without any adult pre-
sent). Courts routinely admit confessions extracted from illiterate, mentally
retarded juveniles with IQs in the sixties, whom psychologists characterize as
[91:26
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When trial judges evaluate the validity of waivers of
Miranda rights under the "totality of the circumstances," they
consider a multiplicity of factors, including characteristics of
the offender-for example: age, education, IQ, and prior con-
tacts with law enforcement-and circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, such as the location, methods, and lengths of
interrogation. 19 The discretionary "totality" approach purport-
edly enables trial judges to protect youths who lack the ability
to exercise their rights or who succumb to police coercion, with-
out unduly limiting police ability to interrogate juveniles.20
incapable of abstract reasoning. See, e.g., People v. Cheatham, 551 N.W.2d
355, 370 (Mich. 1996) (upholding the validity of a waiver by an illiterate juve-
nile with an IQ of sixty-two because "[ow mental ability in and of itself is in-
sufficient to establish that a defendant did not understand his rights"); State
v. Cleary, 641 A.2d 102 (Vt. 1994) (upholding the validity of a waiver by a ju-
venile with limited ability to read or write and an IQ of sixty-five).
19. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968);
Lara, 432 P.2d at 217-19. Several leading cases provide extensive lists of fac-
tors for trial judges to consider when they assess the validity of juveniles'
waiver decisions:
Factors considered by the courts in resolving this question include: 1)
age of the accused; 2) education of the accused; 3) knowledge of the
accused as to both the substance of the charge, if any has been filed,
and the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain
silent; 4) whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to
consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; 5) whether the accused
was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; 6)
methods used in interrogation; 7) length of interrogations; 8) whether
vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior
occasions; and 9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judi-
cial statement at a later date. Although the age of the accused is one
factor that is taken into account, no court, so far as we have been able
to learn, has utilized age alone as the controlling factor and ignored
the totality of circumstances in determining whether or not a juvenile
has intelligently waived his rights against self-incrimination and to
counsel.
West, 399 F.2d at 469; see also Fare, 442 U.S. at 725 (listing factors); Riley v.
State, 226 S.E.2d 922, 926 (Ga. 1976); State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H.
1985).
20. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725. Fare concluded that
there are no persuasive reasons why any other approach is required
where the question is whether a juvenile has waived his rights, as op-
posed to whether an adult has done so. The totality approach per-
mits-indeed, it mandates-inquiry into all the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the juvenile's
age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him,
the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of
those rights.
Id. at 725-26.
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Recently, in Yarborough v. Alvarado,21 the United States
Supreme Court examined another aspect of the Miranda
framework and again rejected youthfulness and inexperience as
factors that merit special consideration. 22 The Miranda frame-
work provides that when police "interrogate" a suspect who is
"in custody," they must administer the cautionary warning in
order to dispel the "inherent coercion of custodial interroga-
tion."23 In Alvarado, police asked the parents of a seventeen-
year-old to bring him to the station for an interview, then de-
nied the parents' request to be present while the police ques-
tioned him and interviewed him alone for about two hours, dur-
ing which time he made incriminating statements.24 Because
the officer did not Mirandize the juvenile prior to questioning,
the issue arose of whether Alvarado was "in custody" and there-
fore entitled to the advisory.25 The Court reviewed several prior
decisions addressing the issue of custody and emphasized that
the test for "custody" was an objective one-whether a reason-
able person in the suspect's position would feel that her free-
dom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with
formal arrest. 26 Although certain facts pointed toward a finding
that the juvenile was in custody and others pointed in the op-
posite direction, the Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that he was not in custody.27 The Court insisted
that, as an objective status, a finding of "custody" does not in-
21. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
22. See id. at 666-67.
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (noting that police must
warn suspects subject to custodial interrogation because of "the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings"). The Court explained that "custodial in-
terrogation" meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of ac-
tion in any significant way." Id. at 444.
24. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 656.
25. Id. at 659-60.
26. Id. at 661-63. The Court in Alvarado relied on its earlier decision in
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), which described the Miranda cus-
tody test:
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what
were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second,
given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once
the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed,
the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry:
was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
27. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664-66.
[91:26
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clude consideration of how the suspect's age or prior experience
with law enforcement might affect his feelings of restraint. 28
The Court explicitly rejected the idea that youthfulness or in-
experience have any bearing on objective determinations of cus-
tody.2 9
28. Id. at 666-67. The Court noted that the Miranda custody test was an
objective one and thus distinguishable from other legal questions, such as the
voluntariness of confessions or consents to search, in which courts also consid-
ered more subjective considerations:
There is an important conceptual difference between the Miranda
custody test and the line of cases from other contexts considering age
and experience. The Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test....
[.. T]he objective Miranda custody inquiry could reasonably be
viewed as different from doctrinal tests that depend on the actual
mindset of a particular suspect, where we do consider a suspect's age
and experience. For example, the voluntariness of a statement is of-
ten said to depend on whether "the defendant's will was overborne," a
question that logically can depend on "the characteristics of the ac-
cused." The characteristics of the accused can include the suspect's
age, education, and intelligence, as well as a suspect's prior experi-
ence with law enforcement .... [However,] the custody inquiry states
an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while
considerations of a suspect's individual characteristics-including his
age--could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.
Id. at 667-68 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 666-67. In rejecting consideration of factors such as age and in-
experience, the Alvarado majority emphasized that "[o]ur opinions applying
the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less
mandated its consideration. The only indications in the Court's opinions rele-
vant to a suspect's experience with law enforcement have rejected reliance on
such factors." Id.
By contrast, the Alvarado dissenters argued that on the facts of the case,
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the interrogation room
and therefore the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes:
What reasonable person in the circumstances-brought to a police
station by his parents at police request, put in a small interrogation
room, questioned for a solid two hours, and confronted with claims
that there is strong evidence that he participated in a serious crime,
could have thought to himself, "Vell, anytime I want to leave I can
just get up and walk out"? If the person harbored any doubts, would
he still think he might be free to leave once he recalls that the police
officer has just refused to let his parents remain with him during
questioning?
Id. at 670-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissenters argued that a youth's age is an objective and
relevant factor that the law uses to modify the objective standard of a "reason-
able person" in a variety of legal contexts. Id. at 674-75. "Common sense, and
an understanding of the law's basic purpose in this area, are enough to make
clear that Alvarado's age-an objective, widely shared characteristic about
which the police plainly knew-is also relevant to the [custody] inquiry." Id. at
676.
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Approximately one dozen states mandate additional proce-
dural requirements for juveniles beyond the "totality" approach
endorsed by Fare.30 These jurisdictions require the presence of
a parent or other "interested adult" at a juvenile's interrogation
as a prerequisite to a valid waiver of Miranda rights.3 1 Juris-
dictions with a per se rule assume that most juveniles lack
competence to exercise or waive their Miranda rights unaided
and believe that they require an adult's assistance to make this
decision. 32 These states have prospectively adopted a categori-
30. See, e.g., Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juve-
nile Custodial Interrogations: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1287,
n.65 (2004); Andy Clark, Comment, 'nterested Adults" with Conflicts of Inter-
est at Juvenile Interrogations: Applying the Close Relationship Standard of
Emotional Distress, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 910-19 (2001); David T. Huang,
Note, "Less Unequal Footing State Courts' Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers
During Interrogations and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 437, 449-55 (2001) (summarizing variations in states' per se rules requir-
ing parental presence or an "interested adult" at a juvenile's interrogation).
31. See, e.g., People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 18 (Colo. 1980); Freeman v. Wil-
cox, 167 S.E.2d 163, 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969); Lewis v. State, 288 N.E.2d 138,
142 (Ind. 1972); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass.
1983) (requiring the state to show that "a parent or interested adult was pre-
sent, understood the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his rights
to the juvenile so that the juvenile understands the significance of waiver of
these rights"); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (holding, as a matter
of state constitutional law, that in order to establish a valid waiver by a juve-
nile, the youth "must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult...
that adult must be one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare of
the juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the
prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juve-
nile; and... the independent interested adult must be informed and be aware
of the rights guaranteed to the juvenile"). Some states require a juvenile below
the age of fourteen years actually to consult with an interested adult, but pro-
vide older juveniles only with an opportunity to consult with an interested
adult as a prerequisite to a valid waiver. See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302,
1312-13 (Kan. 1998); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114-15 (N.J. 2000).
Other states have enacted statutes to require the presence of a parent or in-
terested adult. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (1996) (requiring a
parent to be present at interrogation and advised of the juvenile's Miranda
rights); IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (1998). Analysts note, however, the difficulty
courts confront in determining whether a particular person is an "interested
adult" or has conflicts with the juvenile that prevent her from fulfilling her
advisory functions. See Farber, supra note 30, at 1289-98 (noting that courts
lack criteria by which to determine which adults can function adequately as a
parent/guardian advisor and summarizing cases in which courts approved ad-
visors even though the interests of juvenile and adult manifestly conflict).
32. See Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I Didn't Do It: Protecting the Rights of
Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 355, 370 (2002).
States that require parental presence as a prerequisite to a valid waiver by a
juvenile make two assumptions about parents' role and competence, both of
which may be problematic. States that require parental presence or consulta-
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cal policy to prevent invalid waivers, rather than trying to as-
sess after-the-fact the impact of immaturity on the validity of
each individual waiver under the "totality of the circum-
stances." Some states employ "two-tiered" rules that reflect
gradations of youths' competence, for example, by requiring pa-
rental presence for juveniles younger than fourteen years of
age, but creating only a presumption of incompetence for those
fourteen or sixteen years of age or older.33 Most commentators
tion assume that an identity of interests exists between the parent and child,
and that parents possess the competence that their children lack to provide
them with legal assistance. Parents typically would provide the medium
through which a child actually might contact an attorney and could provide
some psychic support. Robert E. McGuire, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile
Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1382 (2000) (arguing that without adult assistance, juve-
niles will comply with authority figures, misunderstand the warnings given,
and fail to assert their rights).
33. In Massachusetts, for example, police must afford a juvenile younger
than fourteen years of age an opportunity to consult with a parent prior to
waiver, and must allow a juvenile over fourteen years of age to consult with a
parent unless the court finds the youth to be highly intelligent. Common-
wealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657. Similarly, Kansas requires juveniles
younger than fourteen years of age to consult with a parent or counsel prior to
custodial interrogation in order to assure the validity of subsequent waivers
and the admissibility of any statements obtained. In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at
1312-13. These policies are consistent with developmental psychological re-
search that reports that juveniles fourteen years of age or younger consistently
failed to meet the standards of competence exhibited by older juveniles or
adults. See THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 202 (1981) [hereinafter GRISSO, JUVENILES'
WAIVER OF RIGHTS]; Larson, supra note 18, at 648 (describing a "two-tiered"
approach to waivers with enhanced protections for juveniles younger than
fourteen years of age).
Larson argues that if the purpose of the procedural safeguards is to pro-
vide a level of protection for juveniles functionally equivalent to that of adults'
competence, then the "interested adult" provided to juveniles younger than
sixteen years of age should be an attorney. Id. at 661.
This proposal would remedy the problems of allowing parents, who of-
ten do not comprehend Miranda themselves or who provide no guid-
ance, to serve as advisors to their children during interrogation. Fur-
ther, consultation with a lawyer would not hinder interrogation any
more than the current standard, which provides the option of consul-
tation with a lawyer.
Id. Because political support for mandatory consultation with counsel is
unlikely, Larson's fall-back proposal is to provide juveniles younger than six-
teen years of age with access to "a child advocate familiar with the interroga-
tion process who would discuss Miranda with the child." Id. at 662.
Illinois provides for the presence of counsel when police interrogate the
youngest juveniles for the most serious offenses. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/5-170 (2003) (requiring an attorney's presence during the custodial inter-
rogation of juveniles under thirteen years of age suspected of murder or sexual
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endorse parental presence and "interested adult" safeguards, 34
even though empirical research and experience provide sub-
stantial reason to question the validity of the policy assump-
tions and the utility of the rule. 35
assault). Commentators note, however, the extraordinarily limited applicabil-
ity of such protections and the political forces arrayed against providing such
protections more broadly to juveniles. See Jennifer J. Walters, Illinois' Weak-
ened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles: The Requirement of
Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 487,
509-15 (2002) (describing political opposition to extending the right to counsel
for juveniles during interrogation).
34. See, e.g., Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C,
21 WHITTIER L. REV. 521, 547 (2000) (proposing adoption of the "interested
adult" standard); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile
Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can
Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERRO-
GATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 153-55 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed.,
2004) (endorsing a parental presence requirement even though interrogators
typically cause parents to be passive participants when they question juve-
niles); Krzewinski, supra note 32, at 370-83 (advocating adoption of a per se
rule of parental presence); McGuire, supra note 32, at 1359 (advocating modi-
fication of the Miranda advisory to include a warning to a juvenile that she
has the right to consult with and to have a parent present during interroga-
tion); Huang, supra note 30, at 471.
35. Parents' interests may conflict with their child, for example, if the
parent is a victim of their child's assault or theft. Parents also may experience
an "unhelpful" emotional reaction to their child's arrest or may increase the
pressure on their child to confess through the natural parental inclination to
urge their child to "tell the truth." See GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS,
supra note 33, at 180 (finding that most parents encourage their child to coop-
erate with police and to tell the truth); Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When
Police Question Children, Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD.
& CTS. 151, 154 (1999) ("[P]arents often push their children to 'talk' to au-
thorities and to 'tell the truth."'); Larson, supra note 18, at 654 ("[T]he pres-
ence of an interested adult may not help the child and may actually hurt the
child's chances of understanding and asserting his or her rights."). Finally,
parents may lack adequate understanding or appreciation of the juvenile's le-
gal rights or the consequences of waiver. See Thomas Grisso & Melissa Ring,
Parents' Attitudes Toward Juveniles' Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 211, 213-14 (1979) (conducting a survey of middle class parents and
reporting that most would provide little or no advice to juveniles, and that of
those who did offer advice, "60% advis[ed] waiver of rights to silence and coun-
sel and about 16% (about 4% of the total sample) advis[ed] against waiver").
Police strategies to obviate parents' assistance may provide one reason
why most parents fail to adequately protect their children's rights. For exam-
ple, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 301
(4th ed. 2004), recommends that officers assure parents that no one blames
them for their child's misconduct; acknowledge that all children sometimes
disappoint their parents; concede that everyone, including the officer, does
things they should not have done; and emphasize that the officer's role is to
learn the truth. Id. Thereafter,
[a] parent who is present during the interrogation should be advised
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States offer several justifications for requiring the presence
of a parent or other "interested adult" at a child's interrogation.
The presence of a parent may enhance juveniles' understanding
of their rights and the options available to them, mitigate the
dangers of unreliable statements, and reduce the possibility of
coercive influences during interrogation.36 Also, because the
vast majority of states do not systematically record all inter-
views, a parent may serve as an independent witness as to
what occurs in the interrogation room and may help to assure
the accuracy of any statements obtained. 37 To the extent that
the validity of a waiver hinges on a juvenile's cognitive capac-
ity, a parent's presence may relieve police of the need to make a
subjective determination about a youth's competency. 38 Some
courts acknowledge the more punitive role of contemporary ju-
venile courts and the need to provide an additional safeguard to
protect juveniles' rights in order to achieve functional parity
with adult defendants. 39 More practically, children depend on
to refrain from talking, confining his or her function to that of an ob-
server. The parent should be asked to sit in the chair set aside for an
observer.... The investigator should then proceed with the interroga-
tion as though he were alone with the suspect.
Id.
36. See Feld, Juveniles' Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 6, at 117
(summarizing states' rationales for requiring presence of a parent). Some
commentators rightly question the validity of these assumptions. See, e.g.,
GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 166 (questioning the
assumptions underlying arguments that parents reduce juveniles' feelings of
isolation and fear and provide advice about matters beyond their comprehen-
sion); Farber, supra note 30, at 1278 (observing that parental presence re-
quirements anticipate that parents will provide additional protections for ju-
veniles during interrogation, but noting that "data regarding parental
attitudes toward a child's right to withhold information from the police and
statistics concerning adult comprehension of Miranda requirements both
serve to challenge the assumption that parents can adequately advise juve-
niles regarding the waiver of their right against self-incrimination").
37. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 592 (La. 1978) (noting that parental
presence serves several functions).
If the juvenile decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of an
adult can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With an adult
acting in his interest present the likelihood that the police will prac-
tice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the
adult can testify to it in court.
Id.
38. See Huang, supra note 30, at 467 ("[P]er se rules dispel uncertainty
among police officers over whether a confession will later be admissible in
court.").
39. See, e.g., State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1114 (N.J. 2000) (concluding
that because "punishment has now joined rehabilitation as a component of the
State's core mission with respect to juvenile offenders," a parent or legal
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their parents for information about and the money with which
to obtain the assistance of counsel. To the extent that a
Miranda warning includes the right to counsel, parents provide
the practical mechanism by which juveniles can actually exer-
cise that right.40
Minnesota, like most states, uses the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" standard to determine the validity of juveniles'
waiver of Miranda rights.41 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
consistently rejected juveniles' arguments that it should adopt
a per se rule of parental presence as an absolute prerequisite to
the admissibility of statements obtained from juveniles:
Although we recognize that the presence of parents and their guid-
ance during interrogation of a juvenile is desirable, we reject the ab-
solute rule that every minor is incapable and incompetent as a matter
of law to waive his constitutional rights. In determining whether a
juvenile has voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional
rights, parental presence is only one factor to consider and is not an
absolute prerequisite.42
Indeed, a juvenile must repeatedly request access to a par-
ent, both prior to and after the administration of a Miranda
warning, in order for the Minnesota Supreme Court to regard
the absence of a parent as a significant factor undermining the
voluntariness of a juvenile's waiver of rights.43
guardian should be present in the interrogation room whenever possible to
provide a "buffer" between the child and the police); see also In re B.M.B., 955
P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998) ('We cannot ignore the immaturity and inexperi-
ence of a child under 14 years of age and the obvious disadvantage such a
child has in confronting a custodial police interrogation.").
40. See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113 ("[Tlhe parent serves as advisor to the
juvenile, someone who can offer a measure of support in the unfamiliar setting
of the police station"); see also In re Dino, 359 So. 2d at 594 ("Because most ju-
veniles are not mature enough to understand their rights and are not compe-
tent to exercise them, the concepts of fundamental fairness. . . require that
juveniles not be permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own.").
41. See In re M.A., 310 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Minn. 1981); State v. Nunn, 297
N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979), with approval and reaffirming its own adherence to the "totality" ap-
proach in determining the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights by a juve-
nile); State v. Loyd, 212 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1973) (noting that as long as
the questioning by authorities did not lull juveniles into confessions, the confi-
dential and informal atmosphere of juvenile courts posed no special danger
during interrogation).
42. State v. Hogan, 212 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Minn. 1973); see also Nunn, 297
N.W.2d at 755 (rejecting the argument that no juvenile's confession should be
admitted unless a parent or guardian was present when the juvenile waived
his rights, and endorsing application of Fare's "totality" approach).
43. See, e.g., State v. Burrel, 697 N.W.2d 579, 595 (Minn. 2005) (holding
that a juvenile's request to speak with his mother three times prior to admini-
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As a result of Fare and Alvarado, federal and Minnesota
constitutional law is clear and regards juveniles as the func-
tional equivalent of adults in the interrogation room. Just as
with an adult, a Minnesota trial judge must determine whether
a youth has invoked or waived her rights "knowingly, intelli-
gently, and voluntarily" under the "totality of the circum-
stances." Youthfulness, inexperience, and a parent's presence
are simply some of the many factors that judges consider on a
discretionary basis when they evaluate the validity of any
waiver of rights.
II. JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO EXERCISE
MIRANDA RIGHTS
Although "the law" of juvenile interrogation uses the adult
"totality of the circumstances" test, developmental and social
psychologists strongly question whether a typical juvenile has
the capacity to make "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"
waiver decisions. The foremost research, by Thomas Grisso, re-
ports that most juveniles simply do not understand a Miranda
warning well enough to invoke or waive their rights in a "know-
ing and intelligent" manner. 44 This lack of understanding
places juveniles at a comparative disadvantage with adults in
their ability to exercise their rights.45 Of the components of the
stration of the Miranda warning and ten times after the Miranda warning
rendered the juvenile's waiver invalid).
44. See GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 106-07
(reporting that only about half of mid-adolescents understand the Miranda
warning, a rate lower than that of adults); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capaci-
ties to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134,
1152-54 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive] (reporting
that a majority of juveniles who received Miranda warnings did not under-
stand them well enough to waive their rights; that only 20.9% of the juveniles,
as compared with 42.3% of the adults, exhibited understanding of all four
components of a Miranda warning; and that 55.3% of juveniles, as contrasted
with 23.1% of the adults, manifested no comprehension of at least one of the
four warnings); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in Delinquency Proceed-
ings, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131, 138-41 (Gary B. Melton et
al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles' Consent].
45. See Larson, supra note 18, at 648-49; see also Marty Beyer, Immatur-
ity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM.
JUST. 26, 28 (2000) (reporting that more than half of juveniles did not under-
stand the words of the Miranda warning); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles
Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (re-
porting that over 90% of the juveniles whom police interrogated waived their
rights, that a similar percentage did not understand the rights they waived,
and that even a simplified version of the language in the Miranda warning
failed to cure these defects); Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation
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Miranda warning, juveniles most frequently misunderstood
that they had the right to consult with an attorney and to have
one present when police questioned them.46 Grisso reports that
younger juveniles exhibited even poorer understanding of their
Miranda rights than did mid-adolescents:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehen-
sion .... The vast majority of these juveniles misunderstood at least
one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with
adults, demonstrated significantly poorer comprehension of the na-
ture and significance of the Miranda rights.
4 7
Even though juveniles sixteen years of age and older exhib-
ited a level of understanding comparable with adults, substan-
tial minorities of both groups failed to comprehend at least
some components of the standard warning.48
of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights
Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (reporting that about 10% of ju-
veniles invoked their rights during interrogation, compared to 40% of adults).
46. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 115-20 (re-
porting that juveniles did not understand the role of defense counsel and
thought that defense counsel worked for the juvenile court); Grisso, Juveniles'
Capacities to Waive, supra note 44, at 1158; see also Beyer, supra note 45, at
28 (reporting that juveniles misunderstood the role of defense counsel).
47. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive, supra note 44, at 1160.
48. Id. at 1157. A replication of Grisso's research in Canada reported that
very few juveniles fully understood their warnings and that the youths who
lacked comprehension waived their rights more readily. See Rona
Abramovitch et al., Young Persons' Comprehension of Waivers in Criminal
Proceedings, 35 CANADIAN J. CRIM. 309, 320 (1993) ("[]t seems likely that
many if not most juveniles who are asked by the police to waive their rights do
not have sufficient understanding to be competent to waive them."). Another
study reported that youths interpreted the warning that "anything can and
will be used against you in a court of law" to mean that "any disrespectful
words directed toward police would be reported to the judge." Ellen R. Fulmer,
Note, Novak v. Commonwealth: Are Virginia Courts Providing a Special Pro-
tection to Virginia's Juvenile Defendants?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 935, 956-57
(1996) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Youth Advocacy Clinic and
Mental Disabilities Clinic University of Richmond Law School at 3, Novak v.
Commonwealth, 457 S.E.2d 402 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 1416-92-1)); see also
Shavaun M. Wall & Mary Furlong, Comprehension of Miranda Rights by Ur-
ban Adolescents with Law-Related Education, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 359, 372
(1985) (reporting that urban, black high school students' participation in a
year-long "Street Law" course that included education about Miranda rights
did not improve their understanding or comprehension in ways that would en-
able them to assert their rights). But see Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 3, 11 (1997) [here-
inafter Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents] (summarizing research on ado-
lescents' understanding of Miranda warnings and reporting a "good under-
standing for a majority of 16- to 19-year-olds," both delinquents and non-
delinquents).
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Although the Miranda process focuses primarily on factual
understanding of the words of the warning, a waiver of rights
also involves the ability to make rational decisions and to ap-
preciate the consequences of relinquishing them. 49 Simply un-
derstanding the abstract words of a Miranda warning may not
enable a person to exercise the rights effectively. Juveniles, in
particular, often fail to appreciate the significance and function
of rights. 50 Psychological research suggests that adolescents
have difficulty grasping the basic concept of a "right" as an ab-
solute entitlement that they can exercise without adverse con-
sequences. 51 They are more likely than adults to conceive of a
"right" as something that authorities allow them to do, but
which those in power also may unilaterally retract or with-
hold. 52 Research also indicates that children from poorer and
ethnic-minority backgrounds anticipate that law enforcement
officials will punish them if they exercise their rights.53
Moreover, social science research conducted under labora-
tory conditions approved by institutional review boards cannot
begin to capture the social context, stressful conditions, and
psychological pressures exerted during the course of actual po-
49. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (holding that a
Miranda waiver must be "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it").
50. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 130; Grisso,
The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 48, at 11 (distinguishing between
understanding words of warning and appreciating the functions of the rights
that a warning conveys); Larson, supra note 18, at 649-53 (reviewing social
psychological research and juveniles' limited understanding of the concept of
"rights" as entitlements to be exercised).
51. Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 48, at 11 (noting
adolescents' difficulty in grasping a right as an entitlement and arguing that
"comparisons of delinquent adolescents with adults suggest that a larger pro-
portion of delinquent youths bring to the defendant role an incomplete com-
prehension of the concept and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial
legal proceedings"); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand
Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defen-
dants, 27 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003) [hereinafter Grisso et al., Juve-
niles' Competence to Stand Trial]; Larson, supra note 18, at 651-52.
52. Grisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 130 (report-
ing that juveniles conceive of rights as allowances granted by authority fig-
ures, but which authority figures may also revoke); Thomas Grisso, What We
Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, su-
pra note 6, at 148-49 (reporting that juveniles perceive rights to be conditional
rather than absolute).
53. See generally Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New
Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 158 (1989) (arguing that immaturity, in-
experience, and lower verbal competence than adults render youths especially
vulnerable to police interrogation tactics).
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lice interrogation. 54 In addition, the typical samples of public
school youths who participate in laboratory studies to measure
adolescents' ability to comprehend and exercise rights do not
directly compare with delinquents who come from poorer
households and who have more limited verbal skills and
greater difficulty understanding legal abstractions. 55
Children's lower social status, along with societal expecta-
tions of their obedience to authority, makes juveniles more vul-
nerable to police interrogation techniques than adults.5 6 When
people from traditionally disempowered communities-females,
African-Americans, and youth-deal with authority figures,
they often speak less assertively and use indirect patterns of
54. Abramovitch et al., supra note 48, at 319 (noting that responses to hy-
pothetical questions in a relaxed atmosphere do not replicate adequately the
conditions created by police who "can be gentle or tough, can explain the rights
well or poorly, and in many ways can exert varying amounts of pressure to
comply"); Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 48, at 18 (noting
that juveniles appear less able to use the cognitive skills they possess in novel,
ambiguous, or stressful conditions); Grisso, Juveniles' Consent, supra note 44,
at 139; Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act
Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 141, 154 (2003) (acknowledging limitations of ethically constrained labo-
ratory experiments and noting that "the interrogation procedures used in the
present study were very mild compared to those used in real interrogations").
55. See, e.g., Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and
Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with
Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 256 (2005) (examining
the legal competencies of 152 delinquents held in pretrial detention and re-
porting that the majority came from the lowest socioeconomic levels and had
an average IQ of eighty-two); see also Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents,
supra note 48, at 13 (reviewing psychological research and reporting poorer
understanding of legal information and concepts "for delinquent youths with
lower intelligence test scores, lower scores on a verbal ability test, remedial or
problematic educational histories, and learning disabilities"). Grisso further
notes that the "real-world" outcomes for delinquents likely are poorer because
many of the research studies "did not examine delinquent youths who are
most likely to become defendants. Those that did, however, usually found lev-
els of performance that were no better (and often poorer) than the performance
found in studies using nondelinquent samples." Id. at 14. He further empha-
sizes that studies of "normal" or of "average" adolescent populations are of lim-
ited utility for justice system policy makers "if their findings are not replicated
with delinquent youths who, as a group, are not average in their cognitive,
psychosocial, and cultural characteristics." Id. at 21.
56. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on
Children's Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992) (noting that children are
socialized to obey authority figures); Larson, supra note 18, at 657 (summariz-
ing psychological research reporting that "children are more compliant and
suggestible than adults").
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speech to avoid conflict.57 During interrogation, they respond
more passively and acquiesce to police suggestions more eas-
ily.58 As a result, Davis's and Fare's requirement that youths
invoke Miranda rights with adult-like technical precision 59
conflicts with the normal social responses and verbal styles of
most delinquents.
Developmental psychological research on adolescents' ad-
judicative competence raises further doubts about juveniles'
ability to exercise legal rights. Fundamental fairness requires a
defendant to be able to understand the proceedings, to make
rational decisions, and to assist counsel. 60 To be legally compe-
tent, a defendant must have the capacity to understand the le-
gal proceedings; to provide, receive, and understand informa-
tion from counsel; and to make rational decisions. 61 When
57. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 315 (1993); Beyer, supra
note 45, at 35 (reporting that children of color and victims of abuse fear police
and feel they have to confess because "[hiaving been powerless when adults
abused them in the past, these young people probably could not do anything
but comply with police").
58. Ainsworth, supra note 57, at 320. Barbara Kaban and Ann E. Tobey
argue that juveniles are especially susceptible to the coercive pressures of au-
thority figures because of their social disadvantage:
From early childhood on, children are taught to answer questions di-
rected to them by adults. Police officers often occupy an elevated posi-
tion of power relative to children .... [W]hen a "status differential"
exists in the interview context, lower-status individuals are more
likely to defer to the authority of higher-status individuals ...
[W]hen an adult interviewer presents himself or herself as authoritar-
ian or unfriendly, children have more difficulty disagreeing with the
adult.
Kaban & Tobey, supra note 35, at 155.
59. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 452 (1994) (holding that police
may "continue questioning until and unless a suspect clearly requests an at-
torney"); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727-28 (1979) (requiring a clear
and unambiguous assertion of rights).
60. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) ("It has long been ac-
cepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a
trial.").
61. Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 51, at
335 (explaining that adjudicative competence entails "a basic comprehension
of the purpose and nature of the trial process (Understanding), the capacity to
provide relevant information to counsel and to process information (Reason-
ing), and the ability to apply information to one's own situation in a manner
that is neither distorted nor irrational (Appreciation)"). Trying only competent
defendants assures the legitimacy of the criminal process, reduces the risk of
erroneous convictions, and protects the dignity and autonomy of the accused:
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judges make competency evaluations, mental illnesses or de-
velopmental disabilities are sources of impairment that ordi-
narily call into question a defendant's competence to stand
trial. 62
Developmental psychologists argue that immaturity per se
produces the same deficits of understanding, impairment of
judgment, and inability to assist counsel as does mental illness,
and renders many juveniles legally incompetent. 63 The generic
The dignity of the criminal process is undermined if the defendant
lacks a basic moral understanding of the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him or her. The accuracy or reliability of the ad-
judication is threatened if the defendant is unable to assist in the de-
velopment and presentation of a defense. Finally, to the extent that
decisions about the course of adjudication must be made personally by
the defendant, he or she must have the abilities needed to exercise
decision-making autonomy.
Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful
Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 6, at 73, 76.
62. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (requiring a defen-
dant to possess "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him").
63. See Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Questions in
an Era of Punitive Reform, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1997, at 7-9 (questioning youths'
ability to understand trial process, to assist counsel, and to make strategic le-
gal decisions); Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note
51, at 356; Richard E. Redding & Linda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in
the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 374-78 (2001); Eliza-
beth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and
Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 796 (2005).
About half the states address juveniles' competency to stand trial as de-
linquents, and statutes and case law conclude that juveniles have a funda-
mental right not to be tried while incompetent. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.223 (West 2006) (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19 (forthcoming
2006)) (providing for assessments of competency in juvenile delinquency
cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1637 (1997) (describing proceedings to determine
competency in delinquency proceedings); In re Charles B., 978 P.2d 659, 660
(Ariz. 1998) ("Although the Juvenile ... has no mental disorder or disability,
he fits the definition of 'incompetent' . . . because he lacks a present ability to
consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,
and he does not have a rational and factual understanding of the proceeding
against him."); Golden v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000) (holding that a
juvenile has a due process right to a competency determination prior to adju-
dication and that such evaluation should apply an "age-appropriate" capacity
standard to juveniles which is different from the capacity standard used for
adults); In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656, 662 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the "evaluations
of a particular juvenile's competency are to be made with regard to juvenile
[developmental] norms"). See generally In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (stating that providing juveniles with procedural rights in delin-
quency proceedings would be meaningless if the defendant were not capable of
exercising them).
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developmental limitations of juveniles, rather than mental ill-
ness or mental retardation, adversely affect youths' ability to
understand legal proceedings, to assist counsel, and to make
rational decisions.64 The existence of a separate juvenile court
reflects youths' diminished competence, limited understanding,
impaired reasoning ability, and lessened decision-making abil-
ity.6 5
Grisso's recent research evaluated adolescents' and young
adults' adjudicative competence. 66 Like his earlier research on
juveniles' competence to exercise Miranda rights, he found sig-
nificant age-related developmental differences in understand-
ing and judgment.6 7 Most juveniles younger than thirteen or
fourteen years of age exhibited the same degree of impairment
as severely mentally ill adult defendants and lacked even basic
competence to understand or to participate in their defense. 68 A
significant proportion of juveniles younger than sixteen years of
age lacked competence to stand trial, to make legal decisions,
and to assist counsel, and many older youths exhibited sub-
64. Grisso et al, Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 51, at
359-61; Scott & Grisso, supra note 63, at 811-27.
65. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confes-
sions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 1005 (2004) [hereinafter
Drizin & Leo, False Confessions] ("[J]uvenile suspects share many of the same
characteristics as the developmentally disabled, notably their eagerness to
comply with adult authority figures, impulsivity, immature judgment, and in-
ability to recognize and weigh risks in decision-making, and appear to be at
greater risk of falsely confessing when subjected to psychological interrogation
techniques.").
66. Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 51.
67. Id. at 343-46; see Redding & Frost, supra note 63, at 374-78 (summa-
rizing research on adjudicative competence of adolescents and reporting
younger age, lower IQ, and mental illness combine to detract from juveniles'
ability to understand proceedings and to assist counsel).
68. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 61, at 87-88 ("Some youths, espe-
cially those who are nearer to the minimum age for waiver to criminal court,
may have significant deficits in competence-related abilities due not to mental
disorder but to developmental immaturity .... Formalistic, disorder-oriented
application of current standards, therefore, may result in unfair jeopardy for
youths whose developmental incapacities impair their ability to participate in
their defense."); Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand
Trial in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings-Cognitive Maturity and the Attor-
ney-Client Relationship, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 652 (1995) (report-
ing that a majority of juveniles fifteen years of age and younger failed to meet
the adult standard of competence); Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to
Stand Trial, supra note 61, at 344 ("30% of 11- to 13-year-olds, and 19% of 14-
to 15-year-olds, were significantly impaired on one or both of these subscales
[measuring understanding and reasoning]."); Redding & Frost, supra note 63,
at 374-78.
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stantial impairments. 6 9 Grisso reported that
[A]pproximately one fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds are as impaired in ca-
pacities relevant to adjudicative competence as are seriously mentally
ill adults who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial by
clinicians who perform evaluations for courts .... Not surprisingly,
juveniles of below-average intelligence are more likely than juveniles
of average intelligence to be impaired in abilities relevant for compe-
tence to stand trial. Because a greater proportion of youths in the ju-
venile justice system than in the community are of below-average in-
telligence, the risk for incompetence to stand trial is therefore even
greater.70
Even adolescents who may be legally competent in terms of
formal understanding often make poorer legal decisions than
do adults because of adolescents' more limited time-perspective,
emphasis on short-term versus long-term consequences, and
concerns about peer approval. 71 Similar limitations affect the
quality of their decisions to waive Miranda rights as well.
To summarize, developmental psychological research as-
sessing several domains of legal and adjudicative competence
consistently indicates that adolescents as a class are at a sig-
nificant disadvantage in the interrogation room and at trial
compared with adults. For youths fifteen years of age and
younger, these disabilities emerge clearly in the research.
While juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age also exhibit
some degree of impairment, they appear to function at levels
more comparable with adults.
III. POLICE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
By the time the Supreme Court decided Miranda, psycho-
logically oriented interrogation techniques already had sup-
planted physical coercion and greatly increased the Court's dif-
ficulty in distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary
confessions. 72
69. Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 51, at
356.
70. Id. Moreover, age and intelligence interact, such that juveniles with
low IQs perform more poorly than do adults of limited intelligence. See id.
71. Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 61, at 91; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas
Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile
Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 156-57 (1997); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Develop-
mental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 389, 409 (1999).
72. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 221, 221 (1997); Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The
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A. POLICE INTERROGATION AT THE TIME OF MIRANDA
The Supreme Court in Miranda noted that its inability to
evaluate what transpires during police interrogations stemmed
"from the fact that in this country [interrogations] have largely
taken place incommunicado." 73 While the Court recognized that
modern interrogation practices employed psychological ma-
nipulation, rather than physical coercion, it emphasized its in-
ability to discern directly the nature or impact of those prac-
tices. 74 The Court lacked empirical studies or direct observa-
tions of police interrogation practices to form a basis against
which to evaluate interrogation practices. As a result, it relied
heavily on police interrogation manuals and training programs
to identify the procedures that police used to obtain incriminat-
ing statements and to identify those which it found objection-
able.7
5
Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & Soc.
CHANGE 35, 37 (1992); Richard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of
Psychological Interrogation in the United States, in INTERROGATIONS, CON-
FESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 34, at 37, 56 (2004) [hereinafter Leo,
The Third Degree] (describing the evolution of interrogation tactics from
physical brutality to psychological manipulation during the twentieth cen-
tury).
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
74. Id. at 448 ("Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody in-
terrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented .... Interroga-
tion still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn re-
sults in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms."); see also Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:
Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by
Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 (1999) ("The Miranda opinion's descrip-
tion of interrogation techniques contained in police manuals indicated that
long before Miranda, police interrogators had developed sophisticated strate-
gies for overcoming the obstacle of a suspect's resistance to providing informa-
tion to them." (citations omitted)).
75. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. Paul G. Cassell and Bret S. Hayman criti-
cize the Court because
[t]he police interrogation manuals became the centerpiece of what
real-world support there was for the majority opinion in Miranda ....
[A]side from a passing nod acknowledging 'a gap in our knowledge as
to what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms,' the decision rested
on the supposed representativeness of police manuals-not scholarly
investigation.
Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Em-
pirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 844 (1996) (cita-
tions omitted). However, Chief Justice Warren determined the distribution
and extent of use by police of the leading police manuals prior to relying on
those manuals as evidence of interrogation practices. See Charles D. Weissel-
berg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 119 n.48 (1998) (describing
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The Court quoted extensively from Fred E. Inbau and John
E. Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions76 to identify
the techniques and procedures that police themselves advo-
cated for successful interrogation. 77 Miranda repeatedly em-
phasized that the "inherent coercion of custodial interrogation"
stemmed from the interaction of physical isolation and psycho-
logical manipulation that the "Reid Method" prescribed. 78 The
research conducted by the Supreme Court Librarian to determine dissemina-
tion and representativeness of interrogation manuals).
76. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CON-
FESSIONS (1962).
77. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 n.9. The Court characterized the techniques
advocated in Inbau & Reid as "the most enlightened and effective means pres-
ently used to obtain statements through custodial interrogation." Id. at 449.
The successor edition of this text, INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (4th ed. 2004), remains the leading treatise in the field and
provides the framework employed to analyze interrogation practices in this
study.
78. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55. Quoting extensively from INBAU &
REID, supra note 76, and other interrogation texts, the Court noted that
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological
factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being
alone with the person under interrogation."...
"If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the in-
vestigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject
should be deprived of every psychological advantage .... In his own
office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere
suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law."
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the
manuals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the sus-
pect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest
in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to be posited
as a fact. The interrogator should direct his comments toward the
reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than court failure
by asking the subject whether he did it.... The officers are instructed
to minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the
victim or on society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a
psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the
police purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the
contrary are dismissed and discouraged.
The texts thus stress that the major qualities an interrogator
should possess are patience and perseverance....
'"Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he
must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence. He
must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no
prospect of surcease ....
The manuals suggest that the suspect be offered legal excuses for
his actions in order to obtain an initial admission of guilt....
When the techniques described above prove unavailing, the texts
recommend they be alternated with a show of some hostility. One ploy
often used has been termed the 'friendly-unfriendly' or the 'Mutt and
Jeff' act ....
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"Reid Method," summarized in Miranda, remains a primary
technique of interrogation and provides a framework by which
other researchers, as well as this study, evaluate interrogation
practices. 79 It prescribes physical isolation and psychological
manipulation to overcome a suspect's resistance to admitting
responsibility and to neutralize a suspect's feelings of guilt.S0
Interrogators systematically use these techniques of influence,
manipulation, and persuasion to break down the suspect's re-
sistance and denials and to increase her desire to confess.81 So-
The interrogators sometimes are instructed to induce a confession
out of trickery....
The manuals also contain instructions for police on how to handle
the individual who refuses to discuss the matter entirely, or who asks
for an attorney or relatives....
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques,
the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice be-
comes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is es-
sential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside sup-
port. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist.
He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him
describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning,
are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must "patiently
maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired
objective may be attained." When normal procedures fail to produce
the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such
as giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off bal-
ance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his
surroundings. The police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of ex-
ercising his constitutional rights.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-55 (quoting INBAU & REID, supra note 76, at 1, 58-
59; FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERRO-
GATION 185 (3d ed. 1953); CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99, 104, 112 (1956)).
79. See GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 10-21 (2003) (summarizing the elements of the
"Reid Technique" and commenting on its underlying psychological principles);
Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY
266, 293 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room] (describing
Behavioral Analysis Interview questions recommended by Inbau and Reid).
80. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 10-21.
81. See Kassin, supra note 72, at 222 ("[T]his technique leads many sus-
pects to incriminate themselves by reducing the perceived negative conse-
quences of confessing while increasing the anxiety associated with decep-
tion."); Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions:
A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 42-43
(2004) (summarizing the "Reid technique" and describing it as designed to
elicit incriminating statements from suspects by "increasing the anxiety asso-
ciated with denial, plunging them into a state of despair, and minimizing the
perceived consequences of confession"); J. Pearse et al., Police Interviewing
and Psychological Vulnerabilities: Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession, 8
J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (1998) (describing the "Reid
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cial psychologists describe these manipulations as "maximiza-
tion" and "minimization" techniques.8 2 The Miranda Court rec-
ognized, and social psychologists argue, that many of the "Reid
Method" techniques are inherently coercive because they im-
plicitly communicate threats and promises, and thus suspects
require procedural safeguards to protect against such tech-
niques.
B. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON INTERROGATION
Four decades after the Supreme Court decided Miranda,
we still know remarkably little about what actually transpires
when police interrogate suspects.8 3 Several studies conducted
model" as a strategy to "break down the reluctant suspect" and in which inter-
rogation provides an "opportunity to manipulate the suspect psychologically in
order to overcome any resistance"); GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 8 (noting
that all psychologically sophisticated interrogation practices rely on a mix of
processes of influence and persuasion).
82. See GUDJONSSON, supra note .79, at 21; Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn
McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233,
233 (1991); Kassin, supra note 72, at 221.
Interrogators use "maximization" techniques to scare or intimidate a
guilty suspect. Kassin, supra note 72, at 223 (describing the "maximization"
technique as the use of 'scare tactics' designed to intimidate a suspect be-
lieved to be guilty").
This intimidation is achieved by overstating the seriousness of the of-
fense and the magnitude of the charges and even by making false or
exaggerated claims about the evidence (e.g., by staging an eye-witness
identification or a rigged lie-detector test, by claiming to have finger-
prints or other types of forensic evidence, or by citing admissions that
were supposedly made by an accomplice).
Id.
Interrogators use "minimization," or "soft-sell," techniques to "lull the sus-
pect into a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance, face-saving
excuses, and moral justification; by blaming the victim or an accomplice; and
by underplaying the seriousness or magnitude of the charges." Id.
83. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 79, at 266-67 ("[The
gap in our knowledge between legal ideals and empirical realities remains as
wide as ever in the study of police interrogation .... [T]here exist no contem-
porary descriptive or analytical studies of routine police interrogation prac-
tices in America."). Several studies conducted in the late 1960s evaluated the
impact of the Miranda decision on the ability of police to obtain confessions.
See infra note 84 and accompanying text (surveying Miranda studies).
However, Leo correctly notes that "we know scant more about actual police
interrogation practices today than we did in 1966 when Justice Earl Warren
lamented the gap problem in Miranda v. Arizona." Leo, Inside the Interroga-
tion Room, supra note 79, at 267-68; see also Cassell & Hayman, supra note
75, at 840 ("[W]e have little knowledge about what police interrogation looked
like shortly after Miranda, much less what it looks like today .... Even the
most informed observers can offer little beyond speculation on these funda-
mental subjects."); Richard Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM.
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in the immediate aftermath of Miranda attempted to gauge
compliance with the warning requirements and to assess the
impact of warnings on subsequent rates of confessions.8 4 The
general consensus of the immediate post-Miranda impact re-
search was that police complied with the letter, if not the spirit,
of Miranda: they administered the standard warnings, and, fol-
lowing the warnings, most criminal suspects waived their con-
stitutional rights.8 5 Once police obtained a waiver, their inter-
rogation tactics and techniques did not change significantly and
"Miranda did not appear to undermine the effectiveness of
criminal investigation in the way that the law enforcement
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, The Impact of Miranda]
("[E]verything we know to date about the impact of Miranda comes from re-
search that was undertaken when Miranda was still in its infancy.").
84. See Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Imple-
mentation of Miranda, 47 DENVER L. J. 1 passim (1970) (interviewing jailed
defendants about whether or not they received a Miranda warning prior to in-
terrogation); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347,
1348-49 (studying "the effect of Miranda on the role played by defense coun-
sel") (1968); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pitts-
burgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1967) ("Miranda has not
impaired significantly the ability of the law enforcement agencies to appre-
hend and convict the criminal."); Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1613 (1967) (observing po-
lice interrogation of suspects in the aftermath of Miranda and concluding that
"[niot much has changed after Miranda"); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Inter-
rogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda
on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320, 332 (1973) (suggest-
ing a marginal impact of Miranda warnings on collateral functions of interro-
gation, such as implicating accomplices, but finding "very little indication that
the Miranda requirements had materially affected the outcome of formal po-
lice interrogation, or any other factors such as the recovery of stolen prop-
erty").
85. See Leiken, supra note 84, at 47 (reporting strict police compliance
with Miranda's formal warning requirements); Leo, The Impact of Miranda,
supra note 83, at 632; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Sub-
stantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500,
503 (1996) (reanalyzing Miranda studies and concluding that "Miranda's em-
pirically detectable harm to law enforcement shrinks virtually to zero");
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and
Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821, 837 (1996) (reviewing the
post-Miranda impact research and concluding "there is no proof of a Miranda
effect on the confession rate"). Schulhofer attributes the minimal impact of
Miranda to the fact that "[o]fficers learned how to avoid mistakes that would
create admissibility problems; they adapted interviewing methods so they
could honor constitutional rights and still get confessions; and they altered in-
vestigatory practices so they could bolster the evidence in cases where no con-
fession was obtained." Schulhofer, supra, at 507.
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community had initially feared."8 6 Although some scholars con-
tend that Miranda warnings have adversely affected the ability
of police to elicit incriminating evidence and to obtain convic-
tions, most studies conclude that the advisory has had only a
modest impact, if any.8 7 However, only the 1967 study in New
Haven conducted by the student editors of the Yale Law Jour-
nal actually observed police interrogation practices and meas-
ured compliance with Miranda warning requirements.8 8
Few contemporary observational studies of what actually
occurs in the interrogation room exist. Prior to this study,
Richard Leo conducted and reported the only interrogation re-
search in the United States in the last three decades, based on
86. Leo, The Impact of Miranda, supra note 83, at 645 (reviewing Miranda
impact studies and reporting that the Miranda requirements did not appear to
significantly affect clearance and conviction rates, but noting that several
studies attributed a significant decline in confession and conviction rates to
Miranda).
87. Id. at 632. Professor Paul Cassell is the foremost academic critic of the
Miranda decision and its impact on the police's ability to successfully interro-
gate suspects. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the
Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law En-
forcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063-66 (1998) (attributing the drop in po-
lice clearance rates following the Miranda decision to its negative impact on
law enforcement effectiveness). Cassell's own empirical study and reanalyses
of the earlier Miranda research conclude that Miranda has had a deleterious
impact on police interrogation practices and the ability to convict guilty defen-
dants. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 417 (1996) (arguing that the costs of Miranda include lost
confessions, i.e. statements not obtained, rather than simply those suppressed
because of Miranda violations and concluding, based on review of studies, that
the "best estimate is that Miranda results in a lost confession in roughly one
out of every six criminal cases in this country"); see Cassell & Hayman, supra
note 75, at 917-18.
A number of scholars have responded to Cassell's claims about the sub-
stantial social costs and minimal benefits of Miranda and have offered both
substantive and methodological critiques of his arguments. See, e.g., Floyd
Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on
the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1 passim (2000) (criticizing Cassell and Fowles'
claim that a sharp fall in clearance rates occurred after Miranda, questioning
the validity of clearance rates as a proxy for ability to obtain confessions, and
arguing that no reason exists to attribute changes in clearance rates to the
Court's decision); Schulhofer, supra note 85, at 502 (arguing that even Cas-
sell's extravagant claim of a 3.8% reduction in lost convictions after Miranda
derives from "data ... cited selectively, sources ... quoted out of context, weak
studies showing negative impacts . . .uncritically accepted, and small meth-
odological problems... invoked to discredit a no-harm conclusion").
88. See Wald et al., supra note 84, at 1519 (reporting the systematic ob-
servations of interrogations by several editors of the Yale Law Journal who
spent the summer after the Miranda decision in the New Haven police de-
partment).
[91:26
JUVENILES' MIRANDA RIGHTS
his observations of 122 interrogations in an urban California
police department and his review of sixty audio and videotapes
of interrogations from two other police departments.8 9 Leo's re-
search from the mid-1990s is the only naturalistic field study of
custodial interrogation practices in the criminological literature
in the United States. Paul Cassell and Bret Hayman collected
indirect data about some aspects of police interrogation by at-
tending prosecutorial screening sessions in 1994 in Salt Lake
County, Utah, and relying on police officers' descriptions of
what occurred during questioning. 90 In addition, Charles Weis-
selberg used the Supreme Court's original Miranda methodol-
ogy and analyzed police training manuals to assess contempo-
rary interrogation practices. 91
For more than a decade, England's Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) has required police to record inter-
rogations of suspects arrested for indictable offenses. 92 Gisli
Gudjonsson and his associates have developed sophisticated
techniques to code and analyze tapes and transcripts of British
interrogations. 93 They enjoyed extensive access to police de-
89. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 79, at 268.
90. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 75, at 850-52. The Salt Lake County
District Attorney's office evaluates felony cases for prosecutorial merit. "The
screening session is a forty-five-minute interview by the prosecutor of the po-
lice officer concerning the evidence supporting the filing of charges. Screenings
take place soon after the officer completes investigation of the case." Id. at 851.
A law student researcher completed a survey form during the screening ses-
sion. It included data on the suspect, the nature of the offense, whether police
reported trying to question the suspect, whether the suspect was in custody,
whether the suspect invoked or waived Miranda rights, what types of informa-
tion police obtained as a result of questioning, and the officer's estimate of the
length of interrogation. They conducted a case follow-up to determine whether
the prosecutors charged the suspect and the ultimate outcome of the case. Id.
at 923-25.
91. Weisselberg, supra note 75, at 132-40 (analyzing police training
manuals that encourage officers to continue questioning suspects even after
they have invoked their Miranda rights in order to obtain impeachment evi-
dence or leads to other witnesses and physical evidence).
92. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 60(1)(a)-(b) (Eng.) ("It shall
be the duty of the Secretary of State-(a) to issue a code of practice in connec-
tion with the tape-recording of interviews of persons suspected of the commis-
sion of criminal offences which are held by police officers at police stations;
and (b) to make an order requiring the tape-recording of interviews of persons
suspected of the commission of criminal offences ...."); GUDJONSSON, supra
note 79, at 22 (noting that substantial literature exists on police interrogation
practices in England because "[s]ince 1991 there has been mandatory tape-
recording of any person suspected of an indictable offence who is interviewed
under caution").
93. See, e.g., GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 59-60, 79-80.
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partments and to suspects prior to, during, and after interroga-
tion. 94 This extraordinary research access has enabled them to
assess the types of interrogation techniques British police em-
ploy and the impact of these practices on suspects with various
personal and psychological characteristics. 95 Moreover, PACE
requires the presence of an "Appropriate Adult" at the interro-
gation of vulnerable suspects, such as juveniles and persons
with mental illness or mental retardation. 96 The research on
the role played by "appropriate adults" during interrogation
provides an analogue to the performance of parents or "inter-
ested adults" required by a few states during the questioning of
juveniles.97 In addition, Roger Evans analyzed PACE tapes and
transcripts in order to examine some aspects of British police
interrogations of juveniles.98
Furthermore, a substantial body of social psychological ex-
perimental laboratory research, conducted primarily by Saul
Kassin and his associates, analyzes the social psychology of in-
terrogation, the impact of social influences on susceptible sub-
jects, characteristics of individuals that place them at risk for
false confessions, and the types of settings and practices condu-
cive to false confessions. 99 Finally, research by Steven Drizin,
Richard Leo, and others examines documented cases of false
confessions and DNA exonerations in order to identify the cir-
94. Id.
95. See id.; Pearse et al., supra note 81.
96. In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Wis. 2005).
97. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (describing state rules
requiring presence of a parent or "interested adult"); see, e.g., Roger Evans,
Police Interrogations and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 4 POLIC-
ING & SOC'Y 73, 77 (1994) (noting the failure of a vast majority of parents and
social workers to provide any assistance or support to juveniles during inter-
rogation); Jacqueline Hodgson, Vulnerable Suspects and the Appropriate
Adult, CRIM. L. REV. 785 (1997) (U.K.) (noting the problems of implementing
protections for vulnerable suspects including: inability to identify which sus-
pects require assistance; lack of social workers, parents or volunteers to fulfill
the role of appropriate adult; and failure of appropriate adults to appreciate
their role or to protect vulnerable suspects).
98. See ROGER EVANS, THE ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH JUVENILES (1993).
99. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions, 60 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 219-22 (2005) (summarizing a number of his laboratory
studies and simulations of police interrogation); Kassin, supra note 72, at 221
(1997) (describing "maximization" and "minimization" techniques); Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 81, at 33 (referencing nineteen articles by Kassin and
associates on various aspects of the psychology of interrogation).
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cumstances surrounding the elicitation of untrue confessions
and wrongful convictions. 100
Social psychologists and legal analysts contend that
youths' diminished competence, as compared to adults', height-
ens their susceptibility to interrogation techniques and in-
creases the likelihood that they will waive Miranda rights
without adequately appreciating the consequences. 10 1 Juve-
niles' lesser understanding of rights and appreciation of legal
consequences enhances their vulnerability to interrogation tac-
tics,10 2 and their limited ability to think strategically renders
100. See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65; Richard A.
Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interroga-
tion, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 429 (1998) ("Because a confession is
universally treated as damning and compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to
dominate all other case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the defen-
dant. A false confession is therefore an exceptionally dangerous piece of evi-
dence to put before anyone adjudicating a case. In a criminal justice system
... police-induced false confession ranks amongst the most fateful of all offi-
cial errors.").
101. See, e.g., Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 61, at 86-93; Deborah K. Coo-
per, Juveniles' Understanding of Trial-Related Information: Are They Compe-
tent Defendants, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 167, 178 (1997) (reporting research that
concludes that "children are functioning differently from adults within the
court system, and do not have an understanding of the legal process necessary
for competence to stand trial, even after their factual understanding is signifi-
cantly and substantially increased by educational training"); Grisso, supra
note 52, at 141 (arguing that, quite apart from adjudicative competence, the
effectiveness of a juvenile's ability to participate may affect trial outcomes);
Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adolescents,
in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT supra note 34, at 107,
114 (reviewing psychological research on the inverse relationship between age
and suggestibility); Redlich & Goodman, supra note 54, at 147-51 (reporting
results of a psychological study in which juveniles were more likely than
adults to accept responsibility when presented with false evidence that ap-
peared to implicate them); Ann Tobey et al., Youths' Trial Participation as
Seen by Youths and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-Based Is-
sues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL supra note 6, at 223, 231-34 (arguing that juveniles
are less effective as clients than adults because of differences in understand-
ing, memory, attention, and motivation).
102. See, e.g., Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 81, at 52 (summarizing re-
search and concluding that "juvenile suspects are highly vulnerable to false
confessions, particularly when interrogated by police and other figures of au-
thority"); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of
False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 125, 129 (1996); Krzewinski, supra note 32, at 356 (questioning ju-
veniles capacity to understand the privilege against self-incrimination or to
give reliable statements voluntarily); Patrick M. McMullen, Questioning the
Questions: The Impermissibility of Police Deception in Interrogations of Juve-
niles, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 971, 992-99 (2005) (reviewing social science research
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them more likely than adults to waive rights and to assume re-
sponsibility out of a misguided feeling of loyalty to peers. 103
Youths' waiver decisions reflect a greater tendency than adults
to comply with authority figures and to acquiesce to police offi-
cials.10 4 Interrogation techniques designed for adults may prove
especially problematic when deployed against young sus-
pects. 105 This study provides an opportunity to empirically as-
of the impact of juveniles' skewed time perspective, inability to evaluate risks
and consequences, and emotionalism and impulsivity on their vulnerability in
the interrogation room).
103. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 45, at 29-30; Grisso et al., Juveniles' Com-
petence to Stand Trial, supra note 51, at 28; Kaban & Tobey, supra note 35, at
155-56 ("A failure to consider consequences may be due to a lack of under-
standing of the consequences as well as a failure to consider them. For in-
stance, a child may be more easily led into making damaging statements un-
der the pretense that if he or she tells the police what they want to know the
child can go home.").
104. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 381 ("[A]dolescents are clearly
more responsive to negative feedback than adults. This suggests that they do
not cope as well with interrogative pressure as adults and it links this type of
suggestibility with a social rather than an intellectual and memory process.");
GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 18 (assessing claims
that "police interrogations of juveniles are inherently coercive because of the
authoritative position of police and the threatening aura of police stations, in
contrast to the powerlessness and potential vulnerability of many juveniles");
Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 51, at 353; Gisli
H. Gudjonsson, Suggestibility and Compliance Among Alleged False Confes-
sors and Resisters in Criminal Trials, 31 MED., SCI. & L. 147, 149 (1991) (re-
porting that low IQ subjects erroneously believe that false confessions have
minimal consequences and therefore comply more readily with police sug-
gestibility); Matthew B. Johnson & Ronald C. Hunt, The Psycholegal Interface
in Juvenile Miranda Assessment, 18 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 17, 24 (2000)
(noting compliance as a "tendency to go along with instructions and directions
without actual acceptance of the premises"); Krzewinski, supra note 32, at 360
(describing interrogation technique by which "juveniles will readily agree to an
officer's words without understanding the significant implications of these
words"); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth
of the Accused" The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 671-89 (2003) (summarizing three homicide in-
terrogation cases demonstrating police use of leading questions, suggesting
answers, and drafting confessions for very young offenders).
105. See Kaban & Tobey, supra note 35, at 158 ("Interrogation procedures
designed for adults but used with children increase the likelihood of false con-
fessions and may even undermine the integrity of the fact-finding process.");
Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1169 (2001) ("Miranda offers suspects little protection
from deceptive interrogation techniques."); Welsh S. White, False Confessions
and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 118-21 (1997) [hereinafter White, False Confes-
sions and the Constitution] (summarizing standard interrogation techniques
especially likely to elicit false confessions from suspects with particular char-
JUVENILES' MIRANDA RIGHTS
sess some of the social psychologists' hypotheses and concerns
about juveniles' competence to waive or to invoke their
Miranda rights.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
The state supreme courts of Alaska and Minnesota have
long required police to electronically record interrogation of all
criminal suspects. 10 6 In 1985, the Alaska Supreme Court in
Stephan v. State held that an unexcused failure to record a cus-
todial interrogation violated a defendant's due process rights
under the state constitution. 10 7 In 1994, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in State v. Scales declined to find a state constitu-
tional basis for a recording requirement, but held that "[i]n the
exercise of our supervisory powers we mandate a recording re-
quirement for all custodial interrogations."10 8 The Minnesota
Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in Stephan and found
acteristics such as mental retardation and youth); Welsh White, False Confes-
sions in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. JUST. 5, 5-7 (2003).
106. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales,
518 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994). The legislatures in the District of Colum-
bia, Illinois, Maine, and Texas recently adopted laws requiring police to record
interrogations under some circumstances. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-133.20
(LexisNexis 2003); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3930/7.2(a) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (re-
quiring recording of first-degree murder interrogations); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 2803-B (2005); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3 (Vernon
2004).
107. 711 P.2d at 1158.
108. 518 N.W.2d at 589. The court based its decision on its inherent super-
visory authority, rather than the Minnesota Constitution:
We choose not to determine at this time whether under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Minnesota Constitution a criminal suspect has a
right to have his or her custodial interrogation recorded. Rather, in
the exercise of our supervisory power to insure the fair administration
of justice, we hold that all custodial interrogation including any in-
formation about rights, any waiver of those rights, and all questioning
shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be recorded
when questioning occurs at a place of detention. If law enforcement
officers fail to comply with this recording requirement, any state-
ments the suspect makes in response to the interrogation may be
suppressed at trial.
Id. at 592.
The court endorsed the recommendations of the American Law Institute
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure Section 150.3(2) and (3), which ex-
clude statements that involve a "substantial" violation of the recording re-
quirement. Id. at 592. "Substantial violations" included willful or prejudicial
violations, those likely to cause the accused to misunderstand his or her
rights, or those which create a significant risk of false confessions. Id. at 593
n.2(a).
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that
A recording requirement ... provides a more accurate record of a de-
fendant's interrogation and thus will reduce the number of disputes
over the validity of Miranda warnings and the voluntariness of pur-
ported waivers. In addition, an accurate record makes it possible for a
defendant to challenge misleading or false testimony and, at the same
time, protects the state against meritless claims. Recognizing that the
trial and appellant [sic] courts consistently credit the recollections of
police officers regarding the events that take place in an unrecorded
interview, the [Stephan] court held that recording "is now a reason-
able and necessary safeguard, essential to the adequate protection of
the accused's right to counsel, his right against self incrimination
and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial." A recording requirement also
discourages unfair and psychologically coercive police tactics and thus
results in more professional law enforcement.109
Since Stephan and Scales, a few states have begun to re-
quire systematic recording of all or some custodial interroga-
tions, 110 other states are considering such a requirement,'11 and
many police departments do so regularly as a matter of de-
partmental policy. 112 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re
109. Id. at 591.
110. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3930/7.2(a) (requiring Illinois police to
record custodial interviews of suspects investigated for first-degree murder)
§ 5/103-2.1(b); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22. § 3(a)(1)-(2) (barring
admission in any criminal proceeding of any statement made during custodial
interrogation unless "an electronic recording... is made of the statement" and
"prior to the statement but during the recording the accused is given the
[Miranda] warning.., and the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntar-
ily waives any rights set out in the warning").
In Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 2004), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that when police do not record
an interrogation, the defendant may request a jury instruction "advising that
the State's highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations
be recorded whenever practicable," that the jury "should weigh evidence of the
defendant's alleged statement with great caution and care," and that the "ab-
sence of a recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude that the
Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. at 553-54.
111. In State v. Cook, the New Jersey Supreme Court created a Special
Committee on the Recordation of Custodial Interrogations. 847 A.2d 530, 539
(N.J. 2004). The chief justice appointed the members of the Special Committee
in August 2004. See SUPREME COURT OF N.J., SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE RECORDATION OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2005),
http://www.nacdl.org/sl-docs.nsf/freeformfMERIattachments/$FILE[NJ_
MERIRule(10-14-05).pdf, for a summary of the Special Committee's recom-
mendations.
112. See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, PO-
LICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (2004),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/
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Jerrell C.J. recently required police to record interrogations of
juveniles to provide an independent basis by which to assess
the "voluntariness" of their waivers of rights.113 Access to
Scales tapes and transcripts provides the basis for this study of
police interrogation practices.
I collected the data that form the basis of this study from
the Ramsey County Attorney's office because of its proximity
and the willingness of the Ramsey County Attorney and her
prosecutorial staff to cooperate with this study. Ramsey County
is an urban and suburban county in the Twin Cities metro area
that includes St. Paul, the Minnesota state capital, and several
other smaller cities. With more than a half-million total resi-
dents, it is the second most populous county in the state. About
11.5% of the county's population falls within the age jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court. 114 About 69% of the juveniles are
white, 18% Asian, 12% black, and less than 2% Native Ameri-
can. 115 The St. Paul Police, the Ramsey County Sheriff, and
seven suburban police departments provide law enforcement
services for the county's residents." 6 In 2002, the Ramsey
County Attorney's Office filed 3415 delinquency petitions and
682 status offense petitions. 1 7
In Minnesota, sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juveniles
who are charged with a felony are subject to public delinquency
hearings." 8 Because other delinquency proceedings are closed
SullivanReport.pdf (reporting the results of a nationwide survey of police de-
partments regarding their interrogation recording practices in conjunction
with recommendations submitted by the Illinois Commission on Capital Pun-
ishment).
113. In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 123 (Wis. 2005). Wisconsin requires
police to electronically record all custodial interrogations of juveniles "where
feasible, and without exception when questioning occurs at a place of deten-
tion." Id. at 113.
114. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Family
Court Judges (2004), Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990-2004, http:H
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/ezapop/ (follow "County Comparisons" hyperlink).
115. Id.
116. Suburban police departments include: Maplewood, Mounds View, New
Brighton, North St. Paul, Roseville, St. Anthony, and White Bear Lake.
USACops.com, Minnesota Police Department, Ramsey County, http://www
.usacops.com/mnramsey.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
117. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Family
Court Judges, Minnesota Juvenile Court Case Counts, 2000 (2003), http:H
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/ezaco/asp/TableDisplay.asp.
118. MINN. STAT. § 260B.163(1)(c)(2) (2003 & Supp. 2006) provides that
"[t]he court shall open the hearings to the public in delinquency ... proceed-
ings where the child is alleged to have committed an offense ... that would be
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and confidential, the Ramsey County Attorney's Office and I
agreed to restrict this study to older juveniles charged with se-
rious, felony-level crimes. In "deep-end" cases such as these, the
police are likely to employ the full range of interrogation tech-
niques.
Initially, a paralegal in the Ramsey County Attorney's Of-
fice generated a list of cases of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
youths charged with felonies. We restricted the search further
to resolved cases that had not yet been archived. These case
files included interrogations conducted between 1997 and 2004.
She then individually inspected every file to find those contain-
ing an interrogation transcript or tape. 119 In addition, she iden-
tified files that contained a standard Miranda form and no con-
fession as well as police reports indicating that the juvenile had
invoked his or her rights, so we could compare juveniles who
waived or asserted their Miranda rights. Each time she found a
tape or transcript, or a report that a juvenile had invoked her
rights, she copied the file associated with that offense, includ-
ing police reports, Miranda waiver forms, transcripts or tapes
of interrogation, court petitions, certification studies, and pro-
bation sentencing reports. She then redacted references to
other juveniles in those reports to protect their anonymity.
In all of the files containing tapes or transcripts, the Ram-
sey County Attorney's Office exercised no additional censoring
or withholding of files based on their content. She did not hand-
pick or select only "good" cases, but provided me with all the
available files. 120 I obtained a total of sixty-six files of juveniles
a felony if committed by an adult and the child was at least sixteen years of
age at the time of the offense." Even though delinquency adjudications of ju-
veniles sixteen and seventeen years old charged with a felony are public pro-
ceedings, in the course of the research I anticipated that I would inevitably
encounter confidential information regarding other juvenile co-defendants
whose identity remained confidential. At the request of the Ramsey County
Attorney's Office, I obtained a court order from the Ramsey County District
Court authorizing my access to the closed files, with a number of stipulations
to protect the identity of all juveniles I encountered. A copy of the court order
is on file with the author.
119. Although interrogations of juveniles occur far more frequently than
indicated in these files, in the vast majority of these cases, the Scales tapes are
not transcribed. The physical tapes remain in the police evidence locker until
the case is resolved, and then the cassette tapes are destroyed. Without access
to these tapes, it is impossible to know how the recorded interrogations found
in the Ramsey County Attorney's files differ from that larger universe of cases.
120. Thirty files contained only transcripts of interviews or invocations. I
obtained an additional six cases in which police reports indicated that juve-
niles had invoked their rights. I personally transcribed half the sample. The
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who met the search criteria-sixteen or seventeen years of age,
charged with a felony level offense in a certification, an Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution (EJJ),121 or delin-
quency matter-and whose file contained an interrogation re-
cord. I personally transcribed thirty tapes of interviews, both to
preserve confidentiality and to immerse myself in the tenor of
the interrogation room. In addition to the approval and access
provided by the Ramsey County Attorney's Office and the Ram-
sey County District Court, the University of Minnesota Institu-
tional Review Board approved the study protocols and proce-
dures.
Following methodologies employed in other recent interro-
gation research, I read and coded each case file for two primary
purposes. First, I reviewed police reports, witness statements,
property inventories, and any other documents contained in the
file to understand the circumstances of the offense, the evi-
dence available to the police at the time they questioned the
suspect, and the context within which each interrogation oc-
curred. Second, adapting instruments used by other research-
ers,122 I created a detailed coding form to classify and analyze
whether juveniles invoked or waived their Miranda rights,
what took place during the interrogation, how the officers con-
ducted the interrogation, and how the juveniles responded. In
cases in which suspects initially denied involvement, I
identified the techniques interrogators used to encourage them
fact that no one else had transcribed or listened to the tapes since they were
recorded further bolsters my confidence that no censorship of files occurred to
withhold "bad" interrogations.
121. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.130 (authorizing judges to impose juvenile
"blended sentences" in lieu of certification); see also Barry C. Feld, Violent
Youth and Public Police: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
MINN. L. REV. 965, 1038-51 (1995) (describing the genesis of the EJJ prosecu-
tion statute); Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison
Waiver Reform, "Blended Sentencing," and the Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001) (evaluating implementa-
tion of Minnesota's EJJ statute in Hennepin County and concluding that it
had a "net-widening" effect).
122. Richard Leo and John Pearse generously provided me with the coding
instruments that they used in their research on interrogation. See John
Pearse & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Identification and Measurement of "Op-
pressive" Police Interviewing Tactics in Britain, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IN-
TERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 75, 76-114 (2003); Leo, Inside
the Interrogation Room, supra note 79. Leo's coding form followed the protocols
used in Wald's New Haven research three decades earlier. See Wald et al., su-
pra note 84, apps. A, H. A copy of the coding form used in the present study is
on file with the author and available upon request.
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to change their minds and give a statement. Finally, I assessed
how juveniles' invocation or waiver of Miranda rights and sub-
sequent statements or denials affected their case processing
and sentencing. While this study reports on juveniles' compe-
tence to invoke or waive their Miranda rights, forthcoming ar-
ticles will examine police interrogation techniques and the im-
pact of Miranda waivers on case outcomes.
This study suffers from several significant methodological
limitations. There is a major problem of sample selection bias. I
could not randomly select the files I analyzed from a larger
universe of interrogations cases because such an array of cases
simply does not exist. The study includes only juveniles whom
prosecutors actually charged with serious crimes and whose
files contained a record of their interrogation. 123 This restric-
tion significantly biases the sample if compared with the larger
number of cases in which police attempted to or did question
juveniles, but in which the Ramsey County Attorney did not file
charges. Moreover, the fact that the Ramsey County Attorney's
juvenile division files contained these transcripts and tapes
suggests that these cases differ in some unknown ways from
the much larger number of cases in which police interrogated
juveniles whom prosecutors subsequently charged, but whose
tapes were stored in the police evidence lockers and eventually
destroyed. Because the sample contains only cases of sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old juveniles charged with a felony-level of-
fense, many of whom had prior experience with law enforce-
ment, it cannot address how police obtain waivers from and in-
terrogate younger or less sophisticated juveniles who may be
more vulnerable. 124
123. Cassell and Hayman, supra note 75, at 849, criticized Leo, Inside the
Interrogation Room, supra note 79, because his in vivo observations focused
only on questioning by detectives in the police station. "Because of the study's
narrow focus on station house interrogation by detectives, however, it provides
no information on the broader course of police questioning (or nonquestioning)
in cases outside the station house by officers other than detectives." Id. Be-
cause this study relies on actual interrogation records created primarily dur-
ing custodial interrogation, it does not encompass the larger universe of non-
custodial police questioning or interrogation that does not result in the filing
of a delinquency petition.
124. The Central Park jogger case provides one of the most notorious re-
cent cases of multiple false confessions extracted by police from five youths
aged fourteen to fifteen. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 81, at 52 (de-
scribing the special vulnerability of younger juveniles during interrogation).
See generally Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65, at 963-95 (sum-
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St. Paul Police Department officers conducted about three-
quarters of the interviews in the sample. The Department's in-
terrogation practices may not be representative of procedures
used by other police departments in Minnesota or elsewhere. 125
Reviewers of an earlier draft of this article suggested that Min-
nesota police practices probably differ from those in other
states because Scales has required them to record interroga-
tions for more than a decade. It is widely recognized that taping
requirements increase the transparency and visibility of police
practices. 126 Furthermore, the St. Paul Police Department en-
joys a reputation for high professional standards. 127 Reviewers
pointed out, for example, that unlike Leo's research, none of the
officers in this study continued "questioning outside of
Miranda" after a juvenile had invoked her rights. 128
In addition, because of confidentiality restrictions on data
access, I personally coded all of the interrogations. 29 As a re-
marizing cases of proven false confessions, many of which involved younger
juveniles with no prior contact with police).
125. This is no systematic analysis of how different police departments' in-
terrogation practices vary or how those differences affect rates of invocations
of rights or admissions by suspects. The limited research available suggests
how and why departmental practices might vary and produce different results.
See EVANS, supra note 98, at 21 ("[T]here are significant differences in admis-
sion rates depending on the [police] subdivision in which the interview takes
place.... [I]nterview styles may vary from station to station and have an im-
pact on outcomes. This would be consistent with the thesis that police stations
have their own ethos and culture. It would also be consistent with the thesis
that police interviewing techniques take place on the job. If individual police
stations develop their own distinctive approaches then the dominance of on-
the-job training might ensure that these are passed on to new recruits to the
station.").
126. State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994).
127. See CATHERINE COLES, NATIONAL COPs EVALUATION ORGANIZA-
TIONAL CHANGE CASE STUDY: ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA, http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/
cops-casestudy/stpaul2.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
128. I am grateful to Frank Zimring for pointing out that St. Paul Police
Department interrogation practices may differ from those of other law en-
forcement agencies. Compare Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note
79, at 276 (reporting that in four percent of cases in which suspects invoked
Miranda rights, officers continued to question suspects even after an invoca-
tion in the hope of obtaining statements with which to impeach the defendant
or leads to other evidence), with infra note 189 and accompanying text (report-
ing that in every instance in which juveniles invoked their Miranda rights,
police immediately ceased interrogation and conducted no further questioning
"outside of Miranda").
129. The Ramsey County Attorney's Office and the Chief Judge of Second
Judicial District Court (Ramsey County) imposed several conditions under
which I obtained access to confidential juvenile court data. One of the Court's
conditions was that
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sult, I could not use multiple coders or obtain interrater reli-
ability scores and, therefore, more rigorous experimental psy-
chologists properly could characterize some aspects of this
study as "impressionistic." Finally, I only have sixty-six cases,
both because of the limited number of interrogation tapes or
transcripts available and the financial costs of identifying,
copying, and redacting each file. As a result of the problems of
sample selection bias and small sample size, I can make no
claims that this study represents how police interrogate juve-
niles more generally or in other jurisdictions.
Despite these caveats, this study represents the largest
and only aggregation of routine police interrogation of juveniles
in the criminological literature. Although other scholars have
focused on instances of notorious and serious cases of juvenile
"false confessions"13--e.g., the Ryan Harris case, the Central
Park Jogger case, the case of Michael Crowe, et al.-they also
concede that they have no way to estimate how representative
those egregious cases are of the larger universe of police inter-
rogation or how frequently such cases occur. 131 While not nec-
essarily representative, this study provides some insights into
routine police questioning of older juveniles.
Prof. Barry C. Feld shall retain personal custody of all edited files and
no one else shall have access to those files. He shall personally tran-
scribe all tapes not already transcribed and report his research find-
ings only in ways that preserve the confidentiality of the information
contained therein.
Order In re Request of Professor Barry C. Feld to Access Ramsey County At-
torney's Juvenile Delinquency Felony Files (June 1, 2004) (on file with author).
130. E.g., Kassin, supra note 99 (describing the false confessions elicited
during investigation of the Central Park jogger case); Drizin & Leo, False Con-
fessions, supra note 65, at 968-70 (reporting the case of Michael Gayles);
Drizin & Colgan, supra note 34, at 127-62 (describing psychological manipula-
tion and interrogation tactics police used to elicit false confessions in several
high-profile juvenile interrogations); Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 104, at
671-77 (detailing the false confession of Lacresha Murray).
131. E.g., Kassin, supra note 99, at 215 ("[T]he incidence of false confes-
sions is unknown."); Leo & Ofshe, supra note 100, at 431-32 ("[N]o one knows
precisely how often false confessions occur in the United States, how fre-
quently false confessions lead to wrongful convictions, or how much personal
and social harm false confessions cause .... [No one can authoritatively esti-
mate the rate of police-induced false confessions or the annual number of
wrongful convictions caused by false confessions.").
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V. JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO INVOKE OR
WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS 132
This Part presents the quantitative and qualitative data on
juveniles' competence to invoke or waive their Miranda rights.
It examines the approaches and strategies police use to advise
youths of their rights, the ability of juveniles to understand the
warnings, and their decisions to waive their rights. Part V.A
describes the demographic characteristics of youths whom po-
lice interrogated. Part V.B reports where police interrogated
juveniles, how they administered the Miranda warning, and
how they predisposed juveniles to waive their rights. Part V.C
examines juveniles' decisions to waive or invoke their Miranda
rights.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILES WHOM
POLICE INTERROGATED
Table 1 describes characteristics of the juveniles whom po-
lice interrogated and the Ramsey County Attorney's Office
charged. The characteristics of these juveniles differ from the
general caseload of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office. Al-
though the Ramsey County Attorney's office could summarize
the overall volume of delinquency petitions filed in 2004 (3986),
they could not readily provide separate breakdowns of the
number of felony petitions filed, the number of sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old juveniles charged with felonies, or the racial
profiles or prior records of older felony delinquents. 133 However,
the distribution of offenses in these interrogation cases is more
serious than the typical Ramsey County Attorney Juvenile Di-
vision's felony caseload.13 4
132. This Part is based on data from unpublished confidential materials
that are on file with the author.
133. Letter and attachments from Kathryn S. Richtmann, Assistant Ram-
sey County Attorney, Office of the Ramsey County Attorney, to Barry C. Feld
(July 22, 2005) (on file with author).
134. Based on data collected for another study, in 1999 the Ramsey County
Attorney charged a total of 808 juveniles with felony offenses of whom 404
were sixteen or seventeen years of age. Prosecutors charged a total of 236 of
these youths with felonies comparable to those examined in this study: person,
27%; property, 48%; drugs, 15%; and weapons, 10%.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Juveniles Interrogated
Sex of Juvenile N= %age
Male 57 86
Female 9 14
Age
16 43 65
17 21 32
18 2 3
Race
White 18 27
Black 28 42
Hispanic 10 15
Asian 7 11
N/A 5 5
Offense
Person* 34 52
Propertyt 22 33
Drugst 5 8
Firearms§ 5 8
Prior Arrests
None 8 12
Status/Truancy/Traffic 10 15
Misdemeanor Only 20 30
One Felony 11 17
Two or More Felony 17 26
Prior Juvenile Court Referrals
None 25 38
One or More 41 62
Juvenile Court Status at Time of Interrogation
None 37 56
Prior Supervision 12 18
Current Placement-Probation
or Placement 17 26
* Crimes against the person include: aggravated and simple robbery, aggra-
vated assault, murder and attempted murder, criminal sexual conduct, and terror-
istic threats.
t Crimes against property include: burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, receiv-
ing stolen property, possession of burglary tools, and criminal damage to property.
T Drug crimes include possession of a controlled substance and tampering
with anhydrous ammonia equipment (methamphetamine).
§ Weapons crimes include possession of a firearm and discharge of a firearm.
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Not surprisingly, males comprised the vast majority (86%)
of youths whom police questioned. 3 5 About two-thirds (65%) of
the juveniles were sixteen years old at the time of their ques-
tioning.136 I attribute some under representation of seventeen-
year-old juveniles to the fact that prosecutors filed certification
(transfer) motions against more of the older youths charged
with serious offenses. If the juvenile court waived a youth for
trial as an adult, then the County Attorney transferred his file
to the criminal division which made it unavailable for inclusion
in this study. In addition, more of these older juveniles had
"aged out" of the juvenile court's dispositional jurisdiction and
the County Attorney transferred their files to archives for stor-
age which rendered them inaccessible.
Prosecutors charged over half (52%) of the youths with
crimes against a person, such as murder, armed robbery, ag-
gravated assault, and criminal sexual conduct.13 7 They charged
an additional one-third (33%) with felony property offenses,
such as burglary and auto-theft. 138 Moreover, this was a crimi-
nally sophisticated group of delinquents: nearly half (42%) of
these juveniles had one or more felony arrests prior to their
current felony referrals. 139 Nearly two-thirds (62%) of these
youths had prior juvenile court referrals. Finally, more than
one-quarter (26%) of these youths were under current juvenile
court supervision-probation, placement, or parole status-at
the time of their interrogation. 40 The majority of youths whom
police questioned were members of ethnic and racial minority
groups (68%)-black, Hispanic, and Asian-and black juveniles
accounted for the largest group (42%) in the sample. 14 1 By con-
trast, the largest study of proven false confessions emphasizes
the particular vulnerability of younger, naive suspects who dif-
135. See supra p. 68, tbl.1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In my 1999 database, the racial composition of sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old juveniles charged with felonies was as follows: white, 38%; black,
28%; Hispanic, 14%; Asian, 4%; Native American, 3%; and data missing, 14%.
I attribute the overrepresentation of black juveniles in the interrogation sam-
ple to the larger number of juveniles charged with crimes against the person.
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fer in several respects from the older, more criminally sophisti-
cated youths in this study.142
B. MIRANDA FRAMEWORK: CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
REQUIRES WARNING.
When police take a suspect into custody 143 and interrogate
her,14 4 Miranda requires them to administer a warning to dis-
pel the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation.1 45 Police
arrested the vast majority (88%) of juveniles prior to interrogat-
ing them. In a few cases, a juvenile's parent initially brought
her to the police station for an interview, and police arrested an
additional 5% of those youths following questioning. A parent
was actually present during only one interview, and police ar-
rested and detained that juvenile at the conclusion of the ques-
tioning.
When police took these youths into custody, they placed the
vast majority (88%) in detention. However, police released
about 5% of youths whom they had previously arrested and de-
tained after they questioned them. Nearly two-thirds (66%) of
the interviews occurred at juvenile detention centers or other
correctional facilities. Police conducted almost one-third (30%)
of the remaining interviews at police stations, sheriff's depart-
ments, or at the time of arrest.1 46 Police conducted only 5% of
142. See Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65, at 945 (indicating
that police obtained more proven false confessions from juveniles fifteen years
of age and younger than they did from sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
youths).
143. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (defining cir-
cumstances constituting custody as being "based on how a reasonable person
in the suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances").
144. See Rhode Island v, Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980) (defining interro-
gation under Miranda to include "not only ... express questioning, but also
.. any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect").
145. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the admini-
stration of a warning to protect the right to avoid self-incrimination against
the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation).
146. Thomas Grisso reported the only other data about where police con-
duct interrogations and found that police question the largest pluralities of
juveniles either at a police station or in the juveniles' homes. GRISSO, JUVE-
NILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 29-30. Apart from convenience,
he suggested that these venues provided police with tactical advantages be-
cause questioning at a police station increases the coerciveness of the envi-
ronment, while the informality of questioning at home may lull a juvenile into
letting down her defenses. Id. at 31.
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the interviews in non-custodial settings, such as the juveniles'
homes or high schools.
Officers from the St. Paul Juvenile Division conducted
about two-thirds (68%) of all interviews, and officers from the
St. Paul Homicide Division performed an additional 8% of in-
terviews. Law enforcement personnel from three suburban St.
Paul police departments, six county sheriff's departments, the
Minnesota State Highway Patrol, and investigators with the
Minnesota Department of Corrections carried out the remain-
ing interviews. Twenty-one different officers conducted the
sixty-six interrogations in this study; therefore, the results do
not reflect just a few officers' idiosyncrasies.
1. Administering a Miranda Warning
Decades of experience and court-approved formulae have
reduced the Miranda warning to a standardized litany that of-
ficers routinely read to a suspect from a card or waiver form.147
Every juvenile in the sample received a proper Miranda warn-
ing, and nearly three-quarters (73%) of the files contained a
standard warning form that the juvenile initialed and signed.
In addition to the Scales interrogation tapes, these initialed
and signed forms provide police and prosecutors with an addi-
tional, objective basis by which to prove that police properly
administered a Miranda warning and that the juvenile pur-
ported to understand her rights.
147. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 75, at 888 ("[P]olice almost always
followed the Miranda requirements. It appeared that officers generally read
Miranda warnings and waivers from a card."); see also Leo, The Impact of
Miranda, supra note 83, at 659 ("By providing police with a clear rule that al-
lows for mechanical compliance and by providing courts with an objective
standard with which to judge the admissibility of confession evidence, the
Warren Court effectively formalized American custodial police questioning
procedures.").
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Figure 1: Miranda Form
CN
SAINT PAUL POLICE DEPARTMENT
DATE TIME OF INTERVIEW
NAME AGE DOB
ADDRESS MARITAL STATUS PHONE
EMPLOYED BY ADDRESS PHONE
EDUCATION: LAST GRADE COMPLETED-SCHOOL
You have the rights to protection against self-incrimination listed be-
low. Please read along with the Officer, and initial each statement if
you understand it.
1. You have the right to remain silent and refuse at anytime to an-
swer any questions asked by a police officer.
2. Anything you do or say can be used against you.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
you during any questioning.
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you, and
you may remain silent until you have talked to the lawyer. _
The above rights have been read to me. I have initialed each paragraph to
show that I understand each of my rights. I have received a copy of this
form.
SIGNATURE OF RECEIPT
OFFICER DATE TIME COMPLETED
Despite the administration of a Miranda warning, Leo con-
tends that police interrogation shares the characteristics of a
confidence game-"systematic use of deception, manipulation,
and the betrayal of trust in the process of eliciting a suspect's
confession." 148 Trust is the basis of social relationships, and the
essence of a successful "con-game" is the exchange of trust for
148. Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confi-
dence Game, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 259, 261 (1996). Leo notes that several in-
dividual and structural features also affect the use of deception, manipulation,
and betrayal of trust during interrogation. These features include: "the moti-
vation, acting ability, and intelligence of the detective; the sophistication of
the suspect; the perceived seriousness of the case; and the police organization's
support for in-depth interrogation practices." Id.
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hope. 149 Leo likens a police officer's ability to elicit a Miranda
waiver and to obtain a confession to a con-man manipulating
the psychological vulnerabilities of his victim "through false
representations, artifice, and subterfuge." 150 The first task the
officer confronts is to successfully "cultivate" the suspect to ne-
gotiate a Miranda warning and to elicit a waiver. 15 1 Leo de-
scribes a variety of psychological ploys officers use to predis-
pose a suspect to waiving her rights.152 The law of interrogation
applied to juveniles and adults-"knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary" under the "totality of the circumstances"-ssentially
allows officers to employ the same techniques to "con" a juve-
nile as to "con" an adult into waiving Miranda rights.
Police interrogation manuals emphasize the importance of
establishing and maintaining a positive relationship with a
suspect as a prelude to obtaining a waiver from and question-
ing her.153 The timing and administration of the Miranda
warning itself provides officers with opportunities to build rap-
port and subtly to predispose the suspect to waive her rights
and talk with police. 54 For example, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Miranda,155 Rhode Island v. Innis,156 and Pennsylvania
v. Muniz157 allow police officers to ask suspects routine "book-
ing questions" without first administering a Miranda warn-
ing.158 In the majority of cases (56%), police did not administer
149. Id. at 264.
150. Id. at 265.
151. Id. at 270.
152. Id. at 271-73 (describing psychological strategies an officer uses to
elicit Miranda waivers, such as admonishing the suspect of the importance of
telling the truth, nodding her head up and down during the reading of the
warning, minimizing the significance of the warning, and telling the suspect
that this is his only opportunity to tell her side of the story).
153. See, e.g., INBAU & REID, supra note 76, at 93-94 (emphasizing the im-
portance of developing rapport with a suspect and "establishing a level of com-
fort or trust").
154. Id.
155. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
156. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
157. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
158. See id. (holding that questions regarding name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age are not custodial interrogation
because they fall under Miranda's booking exemption); Innis, 446 U.S. at 301
(acknowledging that Miranda does not refer to words or actions normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody, such as booking questions); Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 481 (recognizing that the requirements imposed in Miranda would not un-
duly burden law enforcement officials and exempting routine booking ques-
tions from the requirement to administer warnings).
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the Miranda warning immediately upon engaging a juvenile,
but instead used their initial contact to build rapport while ask-
ing suspects neutral questions-name, age and date of birth,
address and telephone number, grade in school, etc.-while
completing the Miranda advisory form. Some officers used
youths' responses to these "booking questions" as opportunities
to engage in casual conversations unrelated to the subject of
the interview to put the youths more at ease and to condition
them to respond to questions.159
2. Predisposing Juveniles to Waive Miranda Rights
The manner in which an officer gives the Miranda warning
also can influence a juvenile's likelihood of waiving her rights.
Leo and White report that interrogators "de-emphasize the
warnings to such an extent that suspects often perceive that
waiver of their rights is the natural and expected course of ac-
tion."160 They suggest that police may present the Miranda
warning in at least three different ways to elicit a waiver:
First, the police may deliver the warnings in a neutral manner; sec-
ond, they may de-emphasize the warnings' significance by delivering
them in a manner that is designed to obscure the adversarial rela-
tionship between the interrogator and the suspect; and third, they
may deliver the warnings in a way that communicates to the suspect
that waiving his rights will result in some immediate or future bene-
fit for him.16 1
Like Leo, I found that a police officer can subtly attempt to
influence a juvenile's likelihood of waiving her rights by the
manner in which she gives a Miranda warning. For example,
an officer may suggest to a juvenile the value of talking and
"telling the truth" prior to giving the warning:
I'm Officer Smith,162 one of the investigators here, and I just started
investigating yesterday, and what I've learned over the years is
159. Leo also reported that officers made small talk with suspects as they
asked routine booking questions in an effort "to disarm the suspect, to lower
his anxiety levels, to improve his opinion of the detective, and to create a social
psychological setting conducive both to a Miranda waiver as well as to subse-
quent admissions." Leo, The Impact of Miranda, supra note 83, at 661.
160. Leo & White, supra note 74, at 413; Leo, The Impact of Miranda, su-
pra note 83, at 660 (contending that officers "delivered the Miranda warnings
without any build-up and in a seemingly neutral tone, without any apparent
strategy, as if they were indifferent to the suspect's response").
161. Leo & White, supra note 74, at 432.
162. To preserve confidentiality throughout the narratives, I have changed
the names of interviewing officers, juveniles, and other people referred to dur-
ing questioning.
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there's always two sides to every story and this is your opportunity to
give your side of the story. Under law, I have to advise you of your
Miranda, your legal rights, per Miranda, and I'll read those now.
Officers also characterize the Miranda warning and waiver
process as an administrative formality that they must complete
prior to being able to talk with the suspects:
Okay, Susan, due to the fact that you are in custody, I have to advise
you of your Miranda rights before I do any questioning. I do want you
to listen to these rights, because these are your rights.
I'm gonna read this to you real quick. I need your initials and a signa-
ture. It says you have the right to protection against self-
incrimination listed below. Please read along with me and initial each
statement if you understand it.
Leo and White describe one strategy interrogators employ
to de-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warning by
portraying the advisory as "an unimportant bureaucratic ritual
[that] communicates, implicitly or explicitly, that he anticipates
that the suspect will waive his rights and make a state-
ment."163 For example, referring to the Miranda warning as
"paperwork" serves to de-emphasize the significance of the
warnings and to highlight their bureaucratic quality:
Q Tommy, I'm Sergeant Frances. We can go through a little bit of
paperwork. Um, let me explain a few things to you, and then if you
want to, you can sign right there. Okay. Did you say that you're not
working anymore?
A Nope. [Further booking questions and Miranda warning follow.]
An obligatory manner and a mechanical tone of voice also
convey the impression that the warnings are of little conse-
quence.164 Particularly for juveniles whom police have ques-
tioned in the past, officers may present the Miranda litany as a
mere formality.
Q You've been down here before? Have yuh?
A Uhmmmm [affirmative].
Q Okay. Have you ever had these statements read to you before?
A Uhmmm [affirmative].
Q Huh. Okay. I gotta go through these again. If you want to follow
along with me. [Reading of rights form.]
Another officer simply stated: "Okay. You've been through
this before, right? Gotta read you your rights."
Officers emphasize the routine nature of the Miranda
warnings by referring to a suspect's familiarity with it from
163. Leo & White, supra note 74, at 433.
164. Id.
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seeing it on television and in movies. 165 The officer who ques-
tioned the juvenile accompanied by his father exemplifies the
routinization of the warning process:
Okay, um, so that's a fairly serious situation that we need to resolve
hopefully here tonight, but I wanna make sure you understand that
you don't have to talk to me and those kinds of things, okay? Both you
and your dad know how to read, right? Okay. I'll read it out loud to ya
and then I'll let you read it through if you want. Ah, it's a Warning
and Consent to Speak. Okay, basically and you've heard the Miranda
warning on Cops and TV and stuff.
The use of the Miranda warning form itself provides an
opportunity to convert the waiver process into an exercise in
bureaucratic paper-pushing.
Q Okay. I'm going to read these rights to ya. There's a pen. If you
understand these rights, um, I need you to initial stating that you
understand it. If you don't understand it let me know and I'll explain
it to you, okay? Okay. The first one says you have the rights to protec-
tion against self-incrimination listed below. "Please read along with
the officer and initial each statement as you understand it." Okay,
number one says you have the right to remain silent and refuse at
any time to answer any questions asked by a police officer. You un-
derstand that?
A Yeah.
Note that the officer actually read the instructions to the
officer on the warning form in addition to the actual warnings
themselves. This mindless bureaucratic reading of the instruc-
tions to the warnings occurred in about one-quarter of all
Miranda advisories given. For example, in another interview,
the officer also prefaced the administration of the Miranda
warning as an exercise in bureaucratic compliance:
I appreciate you coming down. I mean you've kind of known for a few
days anyway that we've been wanting to talk to ya, okay? John, be-
fore I talk to ya and ask you any questions, I'm gonna advise you of
your rights first, okay? What I'm gonna do John is I'm gonna read
'em, you see right here, it says 1-4, those are your rights, okay? I'm
gonna read 'em to ya and when I'm reading them if there's something
you don't understand or you gotta question, just stop and ask me,
okay? As I read 'em to you, John, and you understand what I'm read-
ing, I need you to initial down the side and when I'm all done reading
'em to ya um, sign your full name at the bottom. And that's just for
your rights. That's just all this covers right here is your Miranda ad-
visory, okay?
165. Id. at 434-35 ("[D]e-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warn-
ings by referring to their dissemination in popular American television shows
and cinema, perhaps joking that the suspect is already well aware of his rights
and probably can recite them from memory.").
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Pursuant to Miranda, police must advise suspects of their
rights.166 But they have no incentive to emphasize the warn-
ing's significance or to encourage youths to exercise their
rights. And they have every reason to embed the warning in a
preamble or mere litany to discourage invocation of rights. The
Supreme Court requires "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"
waivers of rights, but that means only that the police have told
the juvenile that she has rights that she can exercise and that
the youth understands them and voluntarily relinquishes
them.167
C. "KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY" WAIVER OR
INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS
Once police have advised a suspect of her rights, she may
either waive or invoke them.168 The Supreme Court decisions in
Fare v. Michael C.169 and Davis v. United States170 require a
suspect to invoke her rights to silence and counsel clearly and
unambiguously and do not require officers to stop and clarify
any ambiguous invocations. 171 Because a Miranda warning in-
forms a suspect that she has certain rights, she bears the bur-
den to exercise them and to communicate her intention to do so
explicitly to the police. 172 On the other hand, developmental
psychologists question whether younger offenders can even un-
derstand the meaning of the warning or the function of rights,
much less invoke those rights clearly and effectively. 173
166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
167. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 (1987) (noting that the
warning requirement only applies to advisory of rights and not the seriousness
of the crime charged); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (explaining
that Miranda warning suffices without informing the suspect that a family
member has retained counsel who seeks access to the defendant); Leo &
White, supra note 74, at 415 ("[T]he government needs only to demonstrate
that the suspect understood the meaning of the Miranda warnings, not that
he understood the consequences of waiving his rights.").
168. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
169. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
170. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
171. Id. at 459 (holding that if a possible invocation of the right to counsel
is ambiguous or equivocal to a police officer acting reasonably in light of the
circumstances, questioning does not have to stop, but the suspect must unam-
biguously request counsel); Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27 (rejecting a juvenile's re-
quest for his probation officer as a Miranda request for counsel and recogniz-
ing that attorneys play a special role during interrogations).
172. Davis, 512 U.S. at 452.
173. See supra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
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1. Juveniles' Waivers of Miranda Rights
Police and prosecutors may establish objectively that a ju-
venile understands her rights by administering the Miranda
advisory and obtaining an affirmative response. In the simplest
version, the officer reads each of the rights to the youth, fol-
lowed by the question "Do you understand that?" After the ju-
venile affirmatively acknowledges each warning "on the re-
cord," she then initials the form. In nearly half the cases, the
officer had the youth read out loud the final paragraph of the
form, in which the juvenile stipulates to receiving the warn-
ings, initials each right, and signs the form. Following admini-
stration of the Miranda warning, every juvenile purported to
understand her rights. The fifty-three juveniles who ultimately
waived their rights clearly and affirmatively indicated a will-
ingness to do so.
Despite objective manifestations of understanding and an
apparent willingness to proceed, research by Grisso and others
questions whether juveniles subjectively understand the lan-
guage of the advisory or the meaning of rights or possess the
competence to exercise them. Several studies suggest that ju-
veniles lack the linguistic competence of adults to comprehend
the warning, to waive their rights, or to understand the legal
consequences of their actions. 174 In short, the objective appear-
ance of comprehension-an affirmative expression of under-
standing, a nodding of the head in agreement, a failure to ask
questions, the absence of behavioral signs of confusion or cogni-
tive struggle-may reflect compliance with authority rather
than an actual subjective appreciation of the meaning of the
warning.
In addition to formal adherence to the Miranda obligation,
some officers took it upon themselves to elaborate on and to ex-
plain the meaning of the warnings to further clarify youths'
understanding. For example, one officer undertook a simulta-
neous, "dumbed-down" paraphrase of the contents of the warn-
ing.
Q Okay. You've had these read to you before, your Miranda rights.
A Um-hmmm [affirmative].
174. See supra Part II; see also Regina M. Huerter & Bonnie E. Saltzman,
What Do "They" Think? The Delinquency Court Process in Colorado as Viewed
by the Youth, 69 DEN. U. L. REV. 345 (1992); Karen Saywitz et al., Children's
Knowledge of Legal Terminology, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 523 (1990); Trudie
F. Smith, Law Talk: Juveniles' Understanding of Legal Language, 13 J. CRIM.
JUST. 339 (1985).
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Q Okay, I got to read them to you again. I had to read them to Alice
[female co-defendant], too. Okay, follow along with me, if you under-
stand these four, I'll have you initial this here, sign and I'll give you a
copy, Okay. You have the rights to protection against self-
incrimination listed below. Please read along with me, and initial
each statement if you understand it. One, you have the right to re-
main silent and refuse at any time to answer any questions asked by
a police officer. Do you know what that means? It means you don't
have to talk to me if you don't wanna.
A Alright.
Q Two, anything you do or say can be used against you. That means
if you make a statement, I've got to put it in a report. Okay?
A Okay.
Q Three, you have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have the law-
yer with you during any questioning. That means if you wanted to
have a lawyer, you could.
A Uhmmm [affirmative].
Q Four, if you cannot afford a lawyer, if you don't have the money, or
your, is Leslie your mom or dad?
A Leslie is my dad.
Q If he didn't have the money for a lawyer, the court would give you
one and you could remain silent until you had a chance to talk to that
lawyer.
A Okay.
Another officer paraphrased the meaning of the right to
appointed counsel.
Four, if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you, and
you may remain silent until you have talked to the lawyer. That
means if you don't have the money or your parents don't have the
money to hire a lawyer the court will give you one. Do you understand
that?
In the two cases in which juveniles expressed confusion
about the contents of a warning, the officer paused to deter-
mine whether juvenile actually understood.
Q Three, you have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have the law-
yer with you during any questioning. Do you understand that?
A Yeah. I think so.
Q You know what that means?
A Yeah.
In the most complete explanations of rights, officers actu-
ally requested juveniles to repeat back their understanding of
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the advisory in their own words. 175 The following provides the
best illustration of this practice:
Q Okay. Now, uh, we . . . we've already arrested and interviewed
Sally [female co-defendant]. And, uh, [she] was, uh cooperative and,
uh-and, uh, told the whole story and drew a little map here of the
place and ... and explained the whole thing to us. I'm now talking to
you, uh, about this. So, before we go any further, obviously there are a
lot of questions that need to be answered. A lot of things need to be
talked about. Before we do that, I'm going to read you your rights.
Okay?
A I have the right-
Q Well-
A Understand-
Q What I . .. I know you know, but just let me read them again.
Okay?
A All right.
Q You have the right to remain silent. Can you explain what that
means to you?
A That I can just shut up and tell you guys that I ain't talking to
anybody um . . . until I speak to my lawyer. And then we can just go
to court from there.
Q Okay.
A And I'd be locked up.
Q Well. Okay. I-
A [not audible]-
Q I think, I think you got the gist of what it means. Anything you
say is evidence and will be used against you in court. Do you under-
stand what that means?
A Yep.
Q Okay.
175. Drizin and Colgan argue that in the context of Miranda waivers,
many juveniles-for example, those with learning disabilities-may claim that
they understand their rights, even when they do not. Drizin & Colgan, supra
note 34, at 152-53. And once they indicate that they understand their rights,
regardless of whether they in fact do, courts will find they have made a know-
ing and intelligent waiver. Id. Drizin and Colgan propose that rather than
simply relying on a juvenile's "yes" response to the question, "Do you under-
stand your rights?," police should require the juvenile to explain it in their
own words as the example in the text provides:
Police officers and prosecutors who Mirandize children should make it
standard practice to ask the child to explain back to them what each
right means in their own words before proceeding to interrogate the
child and should record verbatim these responses. Their failure to do
so should be held against them by courts when evaluating whether
the child "knowingly and intelligently" waived his rights.
Id. at 153.
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A Everything here is being tape-recorded. If there's evide . . . evide
... evidence that certainly proves that I did that thing, you guys can
bring me to court and play it.
Q Right. Okay. You're entitled to talk to a lawyer now and have him
present now or anytime during the questioning. Do you know what,
can you explain that one to me?
A I could, uh, ask to call my lawyer and that I could be silent until
my lawyer comes. And, I could talk to him in a room that ain't got no
tape recorder or anything and then he could talk to you guys and I
could talk to you, but he ... he does most of the talking.
Q Okay. All right. If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be ap-
pointed for you without cost.
A Yep. [not audible] but they'll-
Q Do you understand that?
A Yeah. [not audible] them . . . them cops, I mean them attorney's
uh [not audible].
Q Okay. But do you understand what I mean?
A Yes.
Q Okay. Now obviously, we need to talk. Ah, we want more than just
your name.
A All right
Q So, ah, having your rights in mind, I... I want to tell ya that I...
I want to talk to you about last night.
A Yeah.
Q And, are you willing to talk to me about that at this time?
A Yeah.
Following administration of the Miranda warning, juve-
niles must either waive or invoke their rights. The standard
version of the waiver process was "bearing in mind that I'm a
police officers, and I've just read your rights, are you willing to
talk to me about this matter?" Again, officer clarified any am-
biguity when juveniles waived their rights:
Q Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
A No...yes, Ido.
Q Yes?
A I wish to talk to you right now.
Justice White's dissent in Miranda identified one of the
fundamental internal contradictions of the decision when he
asked why a waiver of rights is any less the product of "inher-
ent compulsion" than an unwarned statement itself.176 The
176. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)
("The Court apparently realizes its dilemma of foreclosing questioning without
the necessary warnings but at the same time permitting the accused, sitting in
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criminological research literature buttresses Justice White's
concern. The available evidence, primarily from post-Miranda
impact studies, reports that two-thirds to three-quarters of
criminal suspects whom police attempted to question waived
their rights and agreed to talk with the police. 177 Summarizing
the results of the immediate post-Miranda impact studies, Leo
notes that "after initially adjusting to the new rules pro-
pounded in the Miranda decision, police have complied with the
letter, but not the spirit, of the required fourfold warnings;
[and] that despite these standard warnings most criminal sus-
pects routinely waive their constitutional rights . . . ."178
Table 2: Waive or Invoke Miranda Rights
Type of Offense
Person Property Drugs Firearm Total
Waive
N= 31 14 3 5 53
%age Waive 91% 58% 60% 100% 80%
Later Invoke
N= 1 2 0 0 3
Invoke Outright
N= 2 6 2 0 10
Total 34 22 5 5 66
Table 2 reports the number and proportion of juveniles in
our study who invoked or waived their Miranda rights. Eighty
percent of the juveniles waived their Miranda rights. 179 These
rates are consistent with the high waiver rates reported by the
Yale Law Journal-New Haven Study, Leo's California re-
search, Cassell and Hayman's Salt Lake observations, Gud-
jonsson's British studies, and Grisso's earlier juvenile re-
search.' 8 0 Juveniles charged with crimes against the person
the same chair in front of the same policemen, to waive his right to consult an
attorney.").
177. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; see also Cassell &
Hayman, supra note 75, at 859 ("The evidence, although generally quite dated,
suggests that about 20% of all suspects invoke their Miranda rights.").
178. Leo, supra note 148, at 260.
179. See supra tbl.2.
180. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 75, at 859 (reporting that "of sus-
pects given their Miranda rights, 83.7% waived them"); GRISSO, JUVENILES'
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 36 (reporting that about ninety-one per-
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and firearms violations exhibited the highest rates of waivers,
and those charged with property and drug crimes waived their
rights somewhat less frequently.181
The Supreme Court in Fare emphasized Michael C's prior
contacts with police as one factor supporting the validity of his
waiver under the "totality of the circumstances."' 18 2 Similarly,
criminological research also indicates that a suspect's prior ex-
perience with law enforcement is an important factor associ-
ated with rates of Miranda waivers and invocations.18 3 Recall
from Table 1 that 42% of these juveniles had one or more felony
arrests prior to their current arrest. As Table 3 reports, juve-
niles with prior felony arrests waived their rights at substan-
tially lower rates (68%) than did those with fewer or less seri-
ous police contacts (89%).184 However, the differences in rates of
cent of juveniles waived their Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police);
Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 79, at 280-81 (reporting that
almost two-thirds of all suspects questioned and more than three-quarters of
all those who waived their Miranda rights made incriminating statements);
Pearse et al., supra note 81, at 2 (reporting confession rates of 55-62% in a se-
ries of studies conducted in England); Wald et al., supra note 84, at 1562-66;
Viljoen et al., supra note 55, at 261 (reporting that in a retrospective study of
delinquents held in detention, only approximately thirteen percent reported
that they asserted their right to silence).
181. See supra p. 82, tbl.2.
182. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979). Similarly, Grisso
summarized trial courts' assessment of juveniles' prior contacts with police
under the "totality of the circumstances," and reported that
courts have considered a juvenile's lack of prior contacts with police
... as weighing against sufficient understanding of Miranda warn-
ings ... [and] extensive prior experience has sometimes been cited by
judges as suggesting greater understanding of Miranda warnings due
to more frequent exposure to them and familiarity with court proc-
esses.
GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 33, at 64.
183. See infra p. 84, tbl.3. See, e.g., GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS,
supra note 33, at 37 (reporting that juveniles' rate of refusal to talk increased
with the number of prior felony referrals they had experienced); Kassin, supra
note 72, at 40 ("I]ndividuals who have no prior felony record are more likely
to waive their rights than are those with a history of criminal justice 'experi-
ence."'); Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implemen-
tation of Miranda, 47 DENVER L.J. 1, 21 (1970) (reporting that defendants with
more prior arrests and felony convictions gave fewer confessions than did de-
fendants with fewer arrests or convictions); Leo, supra note 148.
184. These findings are consistent with Leo, who reports that
almost one-fourth of my sample (22%) exercised their right to termi-
nate police questioning, while 78% of the suspects chose to waive
their Miranda right .... [Tihe only variable that exercised a statisti-
cally significant effect on the suspect's likelihood to waive or invoke
his Miranda rights was whether a suspect had a prior criminal re-
cord .... [Wlhile 89% of the suspects with a misdemeanor record and
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waivers by type of offense reported in Table 2 do not appear to
be attributable to differences in juveniles' prior records.
Roughly comparable proportions of youths in each offense cate-
gory had similar prior arrest records.1 8 5
Table 3: Waive or Invoke by Prior Arrest Record
Non-Felony One or More Felony
Waive 34 19
89% 68%
Invoke 4 9
2. Juveniles' Invocation of Miranda Rights
Although the developmental psychological research cau-
tions that many younger juveniles are unable to exercise their
Miranda rights, at least some of the older juveniles in this
study clearly appeared able to invoke their rights both initially
and during interrogation. After receiving the Miranda warn-
ings, fifteen percent of juveniles invoked their rights immedi-
ately. After initially waiving their rights, another five percent
invoked them when officers' questioning became more challeng-
ing. Still other juveniles who did not invoke their rights during
92% of the suspects without any record waived their Miranda rights,
only 70% of the suspects with a felony record waived their Miranda
rights. Put another way, a suspect with a felony record in my sample
was almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a sus-
pect with no prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as
a suspect with a misdemeanor record.
Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 79, at 286.
Similarly, Cassell & Hayman also report that "suspects with a prior
criminal record were slightly more likely to invoke their Miranda rights," al-
though they acknowledge that they used too expansive a definition of "crimi-
nal record," which also included misdemeanor arrests. Cassell & Hayman, su-
pra note 75, at 895; see also EVANS supra note 98, at 20 (analyzing a sample of
British juveniles and reporting that "[t]hose with previous convictions are less
likely to confess than those without. This may be open to a number of inter-
pretations. For example, those with previous convictions may have more ex-
perience of police interrogation techniques and therefore may be better able to
resist them and/or have a greater interest in declaring their innocence. On the
other hand they may be more susceptible to arrest and questioning for offences
which they have not committed.").
185. Overall, more than half (58%) of all juveniles did not have prior felony
arrest records. Almost two-thirds of juveniles charged with crimes against the
person (65%), more than half of those charged with crimes against property
(55%), and 40% of those charged with drug and weapons offenses had no prior
felony arrests. See supra p. 68, tbl. 1.
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interrogation exercised some degree of control over the ques-
tions they would answer.
Ten of the sixty-six juveniles invoked their Miranda rights
after police administered the warnings. In the case of one six-
teen-year-old with no prior arrests, after the officer read the
Miranda warning, the youth invoked his right to remain silent
by remaining silent:
Q Do you understand all of those rights I just read to you?
A Yes.
Q Okay, ah, having those rights in mind, do you want to answer
some questions for me here?
A [no answer]
Q It's up to you.
A [no answer]
Q I'm sorry, are you waiting for me or am I waiting for you?
A [no answer]
Q Under . . . understanding your rights, you want to answer some
questions for me?
A What if I don't?
Q It's entirely up to you ... I just ... it's all up to you. There's no,
there's no what if you do and what if you don't.
A No, not really.
Q Okay, very good. We're going to conclude this statement here and
now at about 5:03.
Another case provides a similar example of a youth's abil-
ity to understand and invoke his rights following administra-
tion of a Miranda warning:
Q Do you understand those rights?
A Um-hum [affirmative]
Q Having those rights in mind, do you wish to talk to me now?
A [inaudible] I don't have to if I don't want to?
Q No, you don't have to if you don't want to, but you need to answer
out loud so I can hear ya.
A Nah, I want, I won't answer any questions.
Q You don't want to answer any questions at all?
A Nope.
Q Did you want to have a lawyer with ya?
A Um-hum. [affirmative]
Q You want to have a lawyer present, what ... all right. The state-
ment will then conclude. It's 0246 hours.
Further illustrating juveniles' ability to understand and
exercise their rights, in several cases, juveniles invoked their
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rights during the course of an interrogation. For example, when
an officer interrogating a youth confronted him with an incon-
sistency in his story, the following exchange took place:
A I guess I was watching the movie at 1 [a.m].
Q You guess?
A Can I wait until I get a lawyer?
Q Well, you read your rights, right. You said you wanted to talk to
me.
A Naw, I changed my mind.
Q Okay. Now you changed your mind and you want a lawyer?
A Yeah.
Q Okay. Time is 6:26 [interview terminated].
In another instance, an officer investigating a burglary and
attempted murder confronted a juvenile with statements ob-
tained from his cousin who drove the "get-away" car. The
cousin left the scene after police questioned him as he waited
for the suspect who was inside the building:
A When I got home, my cousin told me that there was police every-
where looking for somebody that had burglarized the house and they
seen him. Don't they have the right to go in the house and see if
someone's in there?
Q I don't understand your question, Frankie. Your cousin already
told me you asked him "what happened to you" the next morning.
Your cousin already told me that you didn't have any idea what hap-
pened to him until the next morning because he was already asleep
when you got home.
A He was asleep? We both were asleep.
Q Well, no, he was asleep, before you got home.
A Okay, I'd like to speak to my lawyer then. [Interview terminated]
Although recording interviews provides the "best evidence"
of what occurs in the interrogation room, some juveniles in-
voked their rights because they objected to the police officer
creating that record. As an officer questioned a juvenile about a
stolen car, the youth objected to recording their conversation
and subsequently invoked his rights:
Q Okay. Whose car were you in?
A Do you want to tape record now, or shall I talk now and then tape
record?
Q I have to, the law says I do.
A I don't want to.
Q Why?
A I don't want to.
Q I have to, the law says I have to have it on.
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A I know you have to have it on, but I don't have to talk to you.
Q Well, you were in a stolen car.
A You've still got me on tape recorder.
Q I have to, I can't turn it off.
A Well, I mean, I don't have to answer your questions.
Q Okay. You're going to be charged with auto theft.
A I mean, I mean I'm going to have to go to trial, whatever but-
Q Okay, I'll conclude this interview at 9:11.
When police fail to administer the Miranda warning or a
suspect invokes her Miranda rights, the Supreme Court allows
prosecutors to use "voluntary" statements obtained thereafter
to impeach a defendant who testifies,18 6 or as a source of leads
to other witnesses18 7 or to obtain physical evidence.18 8 Several
scholars have argued that the Court's approval of the collateral
use of non-coerced statements obtained in violation of Miranda
creates an incentive for police to continue to question "outside
of Miranda" when a suspect invokes her rights.18 9 Unlike Leo's
186. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing use of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach the defen-
dant's testimony at trial because "[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances"). Following the Court's
limitation of the scope of Miranda in Harris, a number of commentators ob-
served that the court provided police with a substantial incentive to continue
to interrogate suspects who invoked their rights. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436,
1442-43 (1987) (arguing that Harris gives police incentives to ignore defen-
dants' invocations of Miranda rights); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1220 (1971) ("Under the
Harris rule, what possible incentive would the police have to comply with
Miranda... ?").
187. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974) (allowing
police to use a statement obtained in violation of Miranda as a lead to identify
a witness whom prosecutors subsequently called to testify against the defen-
dant).
188. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637 (2004) (concluding
that introduction of non-testimonial physical evidence obtained as a result of
voluntary statements, albeit in violation of Miranda, does not violate the privi-
lege against self-incrimination).
189. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 186, at 1442-43 (arguing that the
Court's decisions provide a purely instrumental police officer with every incen-
tive to continue questioning a suspect in violation of Miranda); Stephen D.
Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 451 (2002)
(claiming that police have every reason to question a suspect in custody before
giving Miranda warnings); Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as
a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find
out, and Why We Should Care?, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 583 (1990) (cautioning
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research that reported some detectives continued to question
suspects after they invoked their Miranda rights, 190 in every
case in which juveniles invoked their rights, the officers imme-
diately ceased questioning and no further questioning "outside
of Miranda" occurred.
Even juveniles who did not invoke their Miranda rights
outright still exercised some degree of control over the topics
they were willing to discuss with police. For example, an officer
questioning a young woman driving a stolen automobile sought
the identity of the person who purportedly gave her the car to
drive:
Q Who'd you get it from?
A Uh ... uh ... a friend of mine.
Q What's his name or her name?
A I gotta say?
Q I told you before, I'm reading you . .. I read your Miranda warn-
ing. If you want to speak to me you can speak to me, if you don't want
to speak to me, you don't have to speak to me.
A I don't want to say the person's name.
Shortly thereafter, the officer returned to the question of
the identity of the person who allegedly gave the girl the stolen
car.
A Do I have to say the person's name?
Q No you don't. I'm not... I'm uh not coercing you to say anything.
I'm advising you of your Miranda rights. And your Miranda rights
are you can stay silent. Okay. So as I told you before, you don't have
to answer any of my questions at all. And I gave you your rights and
you advised me that you would answer some of my questions. Okay.
I'm not forcing you... I'm not forcing you to say anything. That deci-
sion is completely yours. I'm just asking you some questions. Whether
that admission of statements in violation of Miranda for purposes of im-
peachment supplies a considerable incentive for the police to violate Miranda);
Leo & White, supra note 74, at 448 (noting that if police believe that "the sus-
pect will soon have a lawyer present or be removed from the interrogator's
custody, they might want to question suspects despite their invocation of their
rights"); Weisselberg, supra note 75, at 132-40 (analyzing police interrogation
manuals and training materials that encourage police to continue questioning
a suspect after she invokes her Miranda rights in order to obtain evidence for
impeachment or leads to other evidence).
Despite the fears of commentators about "questioning outside of
Miranda," Cassell and Hayman report that "in none of our cases did the police
continue questioning a suspect after an invocation of Miranda rights." Cassell
& Hayman, supra note 75, at 861.
190. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 79, at 287 & n.59 (re-
porting that detectives continued to question about one-quarter of suspects
after they invoked their Miranda rights).
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you answer the questions or not are up to you. But I'm telling you is
that you have ... I mean ... this is a felony. You're in a stolen vehicle
... you're driving a stolen vehicle. So we're at . . . we're at a felony
level here. So uh, you know . . . I'm not trying to scare you, I'm not
trying to intimidate you any further. But, I'm just trying to tell you
the realization of what's going on here.
Still later in the interview, when the girl again demurred,
the officer again explained that the decision to provide informa-
tion rested with the suspect and that the interrogator would
not attempt to coerce her:
If you want to give me the name that's fine, if you don't, I can't .. I'm
not going to ... this isn't old cops ... where ya ... where I beat on
you and tell you give me a name. This is... I'm asking you questions.
If you want to answer them, answer them. I can't force you to answer
them. I advised you of Miranda warnings. And that's all I can do. So
if you don't want to answer it, that's completely up to you.
We have no valid or reliable way to measure the subjective
experience of custodial interrogation because it varies with
each individual, with each interrogator-suspect dyad, and with
each offense and offender context. We cannot know directly
what thought-processes occur inside a person's mind. Despite
external appearances and behavioral manifestations of under-
standing, we cannot gauge whether a suspect actually, subjec-
tively comprehends the substance of the Miranda warning or
feels able to act on it. The developmental and social psychologi-
cal literature suggests that many juveniles do not understand
the contents of a Miranda warning or its legal ramifications
and cannot exercise their rights. These concerns are heightened
for those youths fifteen years of age and younger. The Supreme
Court in Alvarado reaffirmed that an inquiry into the "volun-
tariness" of a Miranda waiver or confession includes subjective
elements. 19 1 However, trial judges conducting suppression
hearings seldom conduct extended examinations of suspects'
cognitive, emotional, or motivational characteristics, tending to
rely on more objective, external behavioral indicators. By the
measures on which police and courts typically rely-verbal af-
191. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), where the Court dis-
tinguished between Miranda's "objective" custody inquiry and "subjective"
evaluations that examine the actual mindset of a suspect:
For example, the voluntariness of a statement is often said to depend
on whether "the defendant's will was overborne," a question that logi-
cally can depend on "the characteristics of the accused;" the charac-
teristics of the accused can include the suspect's age, education, and
intelligence, as well as a suspect's prior experience with law enforce-
ment.
Id. at 667-68 (citations omitted).
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firmations of understanding, signed Miranda forms, and ex-
press agreements to waive rights-this study indicates that
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juveniles do understand their
Miranda warnings and at least some can exercise their rights
effectively.
In summary, police use the same Miranda warning and
advisory form to interrogate all criminal suspects-juveniles
and adults. As a minor concession to youthfulness and imma-
turity, some officers took additional steps to explain or to clar-
ify the meaning of the warning. However, police appeared to
use similar tactics to elicit Miranda waivers from juveniles as
did those in Leo's study of interrogation of adults. Initially,
most of them used "booking questions" as an opportunity to es-
tablish rapport with and to condition youths to respond. Simi-
larly, they administered warnings in a way that suggested the
benefits of "talking" and "telling the truth" or in a manner that
indicated the warning was simply a bureaucratic formality that
preceded a waiver and interrogation. And, as with adults, once
police administered the warning, the vast majority (80%) of ju-
veniles waived their Miranda rights and allowed police to ques-
tion them further. In short, police appeared to question these
older youths charged with serious crimes in a manner very
similar to that employed with adults.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: THE VIRTUES OF
RECORDING INTERROGATIONS
Access to Scales tapes and transcripts enabled me to exam-
ine adolescents' ability to understand and to exercise Miranda
rights. The findings provide limited empirical corroboration of
one aspect of developmental psychological research. Sixteen-
and seventeen-year old juveniles exhibit relatively adult-like
competence in the interrogation room. Given a population of
older, criminally sophisticated delinquents charged with seri-
ous crimes, the evidence presented here indicates that sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old juveniles do appear to understand the
contents of the Miranda warnings and about the same propor-
tions of juveniles as adults appear able to exercise their rights
both prior to and during the course of questioning.
Interrogation protocols provide objective evidence that ju-
veniles understand their rights. Police officers invariably read
the Miranda warning to the youths. In nearly every interroga-
tion, the juveniles read along with and initialed each advisory.
At the conclusion of the warning, most youths read aloud the
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final paragraph and signed the statement that they had re-
ceived and understood their rights. The occasional officers'
"dumbed-down" paraphrase of the advisory and some juveniles'
repeating back the meaning of the warning provide further
bases for inferring that these older juveniles understand the
advisory.
Some may object that juveniles' reading the warnings
aloud, initialing and signing forms constitute acts of mere be-
havioral compliance that may or may not reflect true subjective
comprehension. Even if a juvenile subjectively understands the
meaning of the words, she still may feel constrained from freely
exercising her rights by the inherent coercion of custodial inter-
rogation. However, a judge at a suppression hearing would
need to conduct an extended and administratively burdensome
inquiry into a juvenile's cognitive, emotional and motivational
characteristics to make a more complete "subjective" assess-
ment of a youth's cognition and volition. Even if a judge were
inclined to undertake such an evaluation, the evidence to in-
form such a decision would be costly and difficult to obtain rou-
tinely. 192 And, if most older juveniles are as competent as
adults to waive their Miranda rights, then it would be even
more difficult for a judge to distinguish between the majority of
those youths who understand their rights and the fewer who do
not. In the absence of such individualized, labor-intensive in-
quiries, officers' reading aloud warnings to suspects, juveniles'
acknowledging understanding of the warning, and their initial-
ing and signing waiver forms provide the types of "objective"
evidence upon which trial judges and appellate courts necessar-
ily rely to decide whether a youth made a "knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary" of waivers of rights.
This study provides the first empirical corroboration of the
developmental psychological research that reports the relative
adult-competence of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds during
interrogation, at least those who are sophisticated delinquents.
The fact that about the same proportions of the older juveniles
in this study waived their rights as did the adults in Leo's re-
search and other studies provides an additional basis from
192. See, e.g., People v. Lara, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (Cal. 1967) (describing the
"totality of circumstances" factors). Courts typically rely on psychometric tests
and IQ scores, and testimony by clinicians, teachers, social workers, and par-
ents to try to gauge juveniles' ability to understand and exercise Miranda
rights but, they have little legal guidance as to how to resolve disputes in each
case.
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which to infer that these juveniles function about on par with
adults. Significantly, some of these older juveniles effectively
invoked their rights at the outset of interrogation, others in-
voked their rights in mid-stream interrogation, and still others
exercised some degree of control over the scope of questioning.
Because of their similarities with adults, these performances
suggest that these youths understand the substance of their
rights and the measures necessary to invoke them at various
stages of an interrogation.
A. MANDATING RECORDING OF ALL INTERROGATIONS
Based on this study of older, experienced delinquents, we
should address concerns about whether police give valid
Miranda warnings, obtain voluntary waivers, or employ prob-
lematic interrogation techniques by generally regulating police
practices rather than by providing special procedural protec-
tions for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juveniles. 193 For the
past decade, virtually every legal analyst, criminologist, social
psychologist, and policy group has advocated audio recording or
videotaping of interrogations to reduce coercion, to minimize
the dangers of false confessions, and to make the process more
visible and transparent. 194 Recordings provide the most reliable
193. Most analysts endorse either a parental presence requirement to as-
sist juveniles during interrogation or restrictions on the types of interrogation
tactics that police may employ when they question juveniles. See, e.g.,
McMullen, supra note 102, at 1005 (advocating a per se ban on the use of all
deceptive interrogation techniques and the use of false evidence when interro-
gating juveniles); see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
194. Gudjonsson notes that
[t]he electronic recording of all police interviews and interrogations
would be in the interests of justice, and it will come. It would ensure
that what happens in private within the walls of the interrogation
room becomes open to public scrutiny .... [E]lectronic recording po-
tentially gives the defence useful material for disputing confessions at
suppression hearings, although it does of course also protect the po-
lice against unfounded allegations .... There is no doubt that tape-
recording, or video-recording, of police interviews protects the police
against false allegations as well as protecting the suspect against po-
lice impropriety. It provides the court with the opportunity of hearing
and seeing the whole picture relating to the interrogation.
GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 22; see also Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the In-
nocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-And From Miranda, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 553 (1998) (arguing for videotaping interroga-
tions unless a suspect objects to recording and simultaneously loosening
Miranda restrictions on questioning); Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich,
Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police
Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confes-
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evidence of what occurs during interrogation without simulta-
neously reducing the rates at which suspects confess. 195 It cre-
ates an objective record that all parties-police, prosecutors
and defense lawyers, judges and juries-can r3view and
thereby increases the transparency of the interrogation process
and the accuracy of the ensuing evidence. 196 Recording also in-
creases the reliability of statements obtained, avoids the credi-
bility disputes that inhere in "swearing contests" between po-
lice and defendants, 197  and lessens the risks of false
sions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619 (2004); Kassin, supra note 72, at 229-30 (advocat-
ing taping to deter lengthy interrogations and the use of abusive tactics); Ste-
ven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping
of Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois' Problem of False Confessions, 32
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 341-45, 382-89 (2001) (describing the impetus behind
and the politics of Illinois adoption of limited requirements to record interro-
gations); Leo, The Impact of Miranda, supra note 83, at 682 ('The use of audio
or videotaping inside the interrogation room creates an objective record of po-
lice questioning to which all interested and potentially interested parties may
appeal-police, suspects, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and juries-in the
determination of truth and in judgments of justice and fairness. The use of
videotaping is thus the most viable legal intervention for resolving many of
the antinomies of crime control and due process inherent in police interroga-
tion of the accused in a democratic society."); Lawrence Schlam, Police Interro-
gation of Children and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the MTV Gen-
eration?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 901, 902-03 (1995); False Confessions and the
Constitution, supra note 105, at 153-54 (1997) (arguing that recording inter-
rogations enables courts to scrutinize police practices, deters police from using
abusive interrogation methods, facilitates courts' judgments about the reliabil-
ity and voluntariness of statements, and reduces reliance on untrustworthy
confessions).
195. See Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65, at 997 n.681 (re-
porting that police recorded only 2 of 125 proven false confessions in their en-
tirety, and only partially recorded 15 of the remaining false confessions).
196. See, e.g., id. at 997-98 ("[Tjaping leads to a higher level of scrutiny (by
police officials as well as others) that will deter police misconduct during in-
terrogation, improve the quality of interrogation practices and thus increase
the ability of police to separate the innocent from the guilty. Interrogators are
less likely to resort to improper interrogation practices when the camera is
rolling and thus they are less likely to coerce an innocent suspect into falsely
confessing.").
197. Leo, The Impact of Miranda, supra note 83, at 687 (noting that one of
the reasons some police oppose recording is that it provides an objective inde-
pendent basis on which to resolve credibility disputes).
[T~he videotaping of custodial interrogations threatens to shift the
balance of advantage between police and suspects in the "swearing
contest" when their accounts of the interrogation differ in court. Since
they are almost always of higher status than defendants, and since
they control the social production of knowledge about the interroga-
tion and confession, police virtually always prevail in any "swearing
contest." Videotaping custodial interrogations therefore threatens to
undermine their superior control over the legal construction of facts
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confessions. 198 Recording is a neutral, non-adversarial reform
proposal that protects police from false claims of coercion or
abuse, protects defendants whose veracity is compromised sim-
ply by a criminal accusation, and safeguards innocent suspects
against the possibility of a wrongful conviction based on a false
confession. 199 Recording enhances the professionalism of police
investigations, contributes to more effective interrogation prac-
tices, and reduces recourse to abusive practices.200 This, in turn,
enables police to efficiently and effectively investigate crimes
and contributes to the successful identification, prosecution and
conviction of guilty offenders. 201 And, I would add selfishly, re-
about the suspect's interrogation. With videotaping, no longer can two
officers "cleanse" their notes to tell similar accounts that may contra-
dict a suspect's testimony; instead an objective record replaces the of-
ficers' testimony as the most authoritative account of the interroga-
tion . . . . In short, videotaping threatens to expose the secrecy of
interrogation to the scrutiny of others.
Id.
198. A recording provides an independent basis for resolving the "swearing
contest" that inevitably occurs when police and suspects offer conflicting tes-
timony about the administration of warnings, the voluntariness of waivers,
and the content of statements. See, e.g., Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra
note 65, at 997 ("With taping, it is no longer necessary to rely on subjective
credibility judgments to resolve 'swearing contests' between the police and the
defendant about what occurred during interrogation. Unlike the testimony of
two disputants, the videotape does not suffer from the fallibility and biases of
human memory and judgment, but, instead, preserves a record of the interro-
gation that is complete and factually accurate.").
199. Cassell, supra note 194, at 554 (citing instances of false confessions in
which only the availability of tape recordings enabled suspects to demonstrate
that police fed them the information contained in the confessions); White, su-
pra note 105, at 155 (arguing that recording does not adversely affect any le-
gitimate law enforcement interests and provides prosecutors with more con-
vincing evidence that assists them in negotiating better pleas and obtaining
convictions).
200. Leo, The Impact of Miranda, supra note 83, at 683. For example, a
complete recording enables an officer to review the details of an interrogation
that might not have been included in written notes in light of new facts. Drizin
& Reich, supra note 194, at 624 (arguing that recording interrogations pro-
vides "the only viable way to combat the power that these confessions have in
the courtroom because they allow factfinders, prosecutors, and experts the
ability to determine for themselves the reliability of the confession").
201. See, e.g., Drizin & Reich, supra note 194, at 625 (noting that recording
enables police to confront suspects "with an earlier recording containing in-
consistencies and contradictions," and to induce suspects to confess after police
play the statements of their co-conspirators implicating them); see also SULLI-
VAN, supra note 112 (surveying police departments nationwide regarding their
interrogation recording practices in conjunction with the recommendations
submitted by the Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment). The Commis-
sion found that recording greatly enhanced the quality of law enforcement and
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cording also provides opportunities for criminologists, police
professionals, and others to study systematically what actually
occurs in the interrogation room. This will increase our fund of
knowledge and enable us to develop more effective techniques
to elicit true confessions from guilty defendants, to reduce the
likelihood of extracting false confessions from innocent sus-
pects, and to learn better to distinguish between guilty and in-
nocent suspects.
Recordings must include the entire process-from prelimi-
nary interviews through initial interrogation to the final
statement-rather than just the formal culmination of the
process.202 Only a complete record of the entire process can
serve its salutary functions and protect against the dangers of
final "voluntary" statements that ratify earlier coerced ones, or
other statements in which the suspect internalizes unique
knowledge of facts about the crime previously provided by the
police and subsequently repeats them in a false confession.20 3
criminal investigations:
[W]hen detectives recorded the entire interview and later review the
recordings, they often discover significant incriminating matters they
overlooked during the give-and-take of the original interview, such as
false exculpatory statements and alibis, subtle changes of story, and
(with video) body and eye movements indicating deception. This cru-
cial evidence is lost forever if the sessions are not recorded in their
entirety.
Id. at 18.
202. GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 23 ("[T]he first interrogation where
the suspect's resistance is broken down [is crucial to understanding the proc-
ess, and failing to record the entire process] may give a misleading picture of
what really took place during the interrogation .. "). While no system is fool-
proof, complete recording of the entire process provides one of the best protec-
tions against false confessions and wrongful convictions. By contrast, allowing
police to record only the final confession lends the process to abuse, selective
manipulation, and misinterpretation:
[T]he interrogator only makes an electronic recording of the part of
the interrogation that favours the prosecution (i.e. after the suspect
has been broken down to confess and provides a post-confession
statement). The danger here is that the recording will not give the
whole picture of the interrogation process and may seriously mislead
the court. It is essential that all interviews are properly recorded so
that the court will have the best record possible of what took place
during the interrogation. Otherwise it is open to abuse by the police
and can mislead the court. Indeed, without a complete record, allega-
tions of police impropriety (e.g. threats, inducements, feeding sus-
pects with pertinent case details) are difficult to prove or disprove.
Id. at 23-24.
203. See EVANS, supra note 98, at 28 (analyzing tapes of British interroga-
tions and noting that many contained references to interviews conducted prior
to the current recording and in which it appears that "some of this material is
2006]
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In addition to the policy justifications for mandatory re-
cording of all interrogations, the successful experience of law
enforcement agencies in several states and many police de-
partments demonstrates the administrative feasibility of a re-
cording requirement. Given the technological ease, simplicity of
recording, and relatively inexpensive investment, there are no
legitimate objections to requiring police and prosecutors to pro-
vide an audio- or video-tape and transcript in every case in
which the state seeks to introduce a defendant's admissions or
confessions. Unlike the paucity of options available to the Su-
preme Court when it decided Miranda, state legislatures and
state supreme courts today have viable alternatives available
to ensure the adequacy of warnings and the voluntariness of
waivers and subsequent statements. They should mandate
complete recordings of all police interrogations to ensure that
the state provides the best evidence documenting the process.
Courts control the evidence they allow parties to introduce in
proceedings and judges should insist on the best evidence. Po-
lice interrogation practices deliberately create the conditions-
isolation, incommunicado questioning-that make after-the-
fact determinations of what occurred so difficult. There simply
is no justification to rely on fallible, biased, and contradictory
human memories about secretive and highly stressful events
that occurred several months earlier when it is so easy to ob-
tain an objective and unimpeachable record of the same event.
Unlike other analysts who recommend recording all inter-
rogations, I add one cautionary observation about the virtues of
recording. Scholars emphasize the value of recordings for
prosecutors to assess the demeanor and sophistication of a de-
fendant, for defense attorneys to manage their case-loads by
persuading guilty clients to plead guilty, and for judges and ju-
ries to assess a defendant's state of mind and the accuracy of a
statement. 20 4 However, recordings are not self-executing and
just because a tape exists does not mean that anyone can or
will review it. For every hour of a tape, someone must devote
an hour to listening to or watching it. We must multiply that
fed into the formal interview process"); Kassin, supra note 99, at 225 (noting
that accurate determinations of voluntariness and guilt depend on fact-finders
seeing "not only the final confession but the conditions that prompted it and
the sources of the details that it contained").
204. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GELLER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VIDEO-
TAPING INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (Mar. 1993); Leo, The Impact of
Miranda, supra note 83, at 684.
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burden by every defendant questioned whether or not the case
ultimately goes to trial. Although the party who offers a tape in
evidence has the responsibility to provide the court with a tran-
script, 20 5 both prosecutors and defense attorneys must review a
tape prior to transcription to determine whether it has eviden-
tial value to either party. Moreover, someone must compare the
transcript with the original tape recording from which it was
derived to assure its accuracy. 206 While the reports by police
who questioned a suspect may alert a prosecutor to the eviden-
tiary value of the interrogation, their reports may not always
identify instances of Miranda errors, coercive questioning, or
exculpatory evidence that prosecutors must disclose to the de-
fense. 20 7 Similarly, because most delinquency defendants do not
know enough to advise their lawyers whether police gave in-
adequate warnings or used improper techniques, either a para-
legal, a law clerk, or an attorney must review the tape. As I
discovered while conducting this research, the quality of re-
cording is often poor and the process of transcription can be te-
dious and labor intensive. These characteristics detract from
the quality of transcription and increase the costs of producing
205. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that at the Omni-
bus (suppression) Hearing, "If either party offers into evidence a videotape or
audiotape exhibit, that party may also provide to the court a transcript of the
proposed exhibit which will be made a part of the record." MINN. R. CRIM.
PROC. § 11.02 subdiv. 1.
206. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 79, at 85 (noting that a bare transcript
provides only a "black and white" depiction of events in the interrogation
room, whereas audio-tape provides the "colour" of what transpired). Even
more importantly, however, transcripts are subject to error. "The simple expe-
dient of checking the typed transcript with the audiotape recording cannot be
overlooked, for, without exception, discrepancies were unearthed. In a number
of the cases these were major errors, which if left unchallenged would repre-
sent a serious example of misrepresentation." Id.; see also EVANS, supra note
98, at 47 (reporting that when cases go to court, litigants tended to rely on po-
lice reports, and "Crown Prosecution Service or defence solicitors rarely listen
to taped interviews").
207. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (requiring
prosecutors to disclose evidence to the defense that is "favorable to the ac-
cused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching..."); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding a constitutional duty for the
prosecution to disclose to the defendant any exculpatory evidence within its
possession). Indeed, Evans' research in England involved a detailed compari-
son of the police records' reports of the outcomes of interrogations with the
taped interviews and reported substantial discrepancies. "In some cases the
police record of the interview stated that the suspect had made a confession
and in others there was no clear statement about whether or not the suspect
had confessed when in the researchers' judgment the suspect had clearly de-
nied the offence." EVANS, supra note 98, at 47.
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transcripts. Also, someone must verify the transcripts against
the original recordings on which they are based. Despite these
considerable burdens, a complete record of every aspect of an
interrogation is indispensable in those relatively few cases in
which the validity and reliability of a suspect's statement ulti-
mately becomes critical.
CONCLUSION
Developmental psychological research over the past quar-
ter-century has consistently emphasized adolescents' inability
to understand or to exercise their Miranda rights during inter-
rogation and their adjudicative incompetence during legal pro-
ceedings. In addition, the heightened awareness of juveniles'
false confessions in the past decade-exemplified by cases like
Michael Crowe, the Ryan Harris youngsters, and the Central
Park jogger-further underscores the unique vulnerability of
youth in the interrogation room. In the largest study to date,
more than one-third of proven false confessions (35%) cases in-
volved suspects under the age of eighteen.208 When I began this
project, I had no idea what to expect because no one had ever
studied routine police interrogation of juveniles. However, the
cautionary findings of the developmental psychology and false
confessions research augured ill.
The Supreme Court's decisions on interrogating juveniles
treat them as the functional equals of adults, requiring them to
invoke their Miranda rights with adult-like clarity and relying
on the adult standard-"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntar-
ily" under the "totality of the circumstances"-to assess
whether they competently waived their rights. Despite creating
a misplaced equivalency between juveniles and adults, the
Court's decisions in those cases-Haley, Gallegos, Gault, Fare,
and Alvarado-actually may have reached the correct results
and drawn a proper line between younger and older youths. In
Gallegos, the Court ruled involuntary the confession obtained
from "a child of 14."209 In Haley, the Court reversed the convic-
tion of a fifteen-year-old "lad" from whom police obtained a con-
fession at five o'clock in the morning after nearly six hours of
continuous interrogation by relay teams of police officers. In
Gault, the Court reversed the conviction of fifteen-year-old Ge-
rald Gault and granted delinquents procedural protections at
208. See Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65, at 944-45, 963-73.
209. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962).
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trial including the privilege against self-incrimination. By con-
trast, the Court in Fare upheld the waiver of Miranda rights by
a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old with prior experience with the po-
lice and in Alvarado declined to find the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation of a seventeen-year-old youth to be
custodial and admitted his statement. Thus, the Court's deci-
sions excluded statements obtained from more vulnerable
youths fifteen years of age or younger and admitted those elic-
ited from older youths. Unfortunately, while the Court ad-
verted to the significance of youthfulness and inexperience, it
did not base its decisions on specific ages as proxies for devel-
opmental competence. Without such a definitive directive, trial
judges must apply the Court's "totality of the circumstances"
standard to younger juveniles who manifestly lack the compe-
tence to make valid waiver decisions, and judges routinely ad-
mit uncomprehending waivers and unreliable statements.
The actual outcomes in the Court's five juvenile interroga-
tion decisions closely track the developmental psychological re-
search on juveniles' ability to understand and waive Miranda
rights and their competence to participate in the legal system.
Research by Grisso and others strongly indicates that juveniles
fifteen years of age and younger lack the cognitive abilities and
qualities of judgment necessary to exercise their Miranda
rights or to assist their attorneys. By contrast, the developmen-
tal psychological research suggests that sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old juveniles function more or less on a par with adults.
Most adults waive their Miranda rights and incriminate them-
selves to their detriment, and older adolescents appear to un-
derstand and exercise their rights about as well (or as badly).
The findings in this study are very consistent with labora-
tory research reporting the relative competence of older adoles-
cents. This consistency also tends to bolster the validity of de-
velopmental psychologists' experimental findings that younger
juveniles do not understand their Miranda rights, lack adjudi-
cative competence, and remain at greater risk to give false con-
fessions. In short, if developmental psychologists are correct
about one aspect of adolescents' competence, then they are
more likely right about the other as well. In the most recent
study of proven false confessions, police obtained more false
confessions from youths fifteen years of age and younger than
they did from sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, even though
2006]
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the latter commit a much larger proportion of all crimes and of
serious crimes.2 10
Thus, while this study provides some comfort that the legal
regime may be adequate for older adolescents, it heightens con-
cern that the legal framework is inadequate to protect younger
juveniles. While several state court decisions or statutes man-
date special protections for juveniles younger than fourteen
years of age, such as the presence of a parent or other "inter-
ested adult,"2 11 those youngest juveniles account for a very
small proportion of the most serious crimes. 212 Delinquents
fourteen and fifteen years of age are far more numerous than
their younger peers who receive special legal protections and
much more vulnerable than their older counterparts who may
not need additional procedural safeguards.
This study is only the second naturalistic empirical study
of police interrogation in the United States in the past three
decades, and the first involving juveniles. We need far more
empirical research on interrogation practices in general, in a
number of different settings, and with more knowledge about
the subjective characteristics of suspects. As more jurisdictions
adopt taping and recording requirements, we will have further
opportunity to conduct this type of research. Many instances of
false confessions and most of the developmental psychologists
concerns about adolescents' competence to exercise and waive
Miranda rights involve juveniles younger than those studied
here. Because of these serious concerns, we need empirical
studies of police interrogation of fourteen- and fifteen-year-old
juveniles to enable us to test the hypotheses of developmental
psychologists and to compare the youngest juveniles' perform-
ances with those of their somewhat older peers.
210. See Drizin & Leo, False Confessions, supra note 65, at 945 (reporting
that youths aged sixteen and seventeen accounted for 16% of the false confes-
sions, while youths aged 15 or younger accounted for 19%).
211. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFEND-
ERS AND VICTIMS: NATIONAL REPORT 130 (2006) (summarizing arrest data for
younger juveniles).
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